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INTRODUCTION 
To those familiar with disability discrimination law, the basic 
standard is well-rehearsed:  in order to establish the existence of a 
disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the 
plaintiff must prove that she has an impairment that substantially 
limits a major life activity.1  “Substantially limits” is a stringent 
threshold, with courts (including the United States Supreme Court) 
insisting that only a narrow set of deserving cases qualify for 
protection.2  Each case requires an individualized determination of 
whether the disability threshold is met.3  The case reporters are 
replete with opinions finding the plaintiff failed to meet the 
substantial limitation threshold.4 
But one aspect of this standard has been largely ignored by both 
scholars and, it would seem, ADA plaintiffs’ counsel.  The ADA 
regulations define substantial limitation by comparison to “the 
average person in the general population.”5  While a lot of attention 
                                                          
 1. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000). 
 2. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 196–97 (2002) 
(reasoning that the use of the term “substantial” indicates an impairment that 
interferes in a minor way will not qualify as a disability); Sutton v. United Air Lines, 
Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482-83 (1999) (interpreting the ADA to exclude protection of 
individuals whose impairments can be controlled by medication or other mitigating 
measures). 
 3. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 483. 
 4. See Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act:  A Windfall for Defendants, 
34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 119 & nn.107–12, 120–26 (1999) (finding that courts 
are deciding ADA cases on summary judgment because the plaintiff has failed to 
prove, among other issues, that the impairment at issue substantially limits a major 
life activity). 
 5. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1) (2007). 
 2007] COMPARATIVE EVIDENCE OR COMMON EXPERIENCE 411 
has been paid to the concept of “substantial,” considerably less has 
been paid to the concept of the “average person.”  Most academic 
commentary on the ADA glosses over the “average person” 
requirement entirely.6  A number of court decisions suggest plaintiffs’ 
counsel have done the same, only to have their clients’ cases 
dismissed for failure to present sufficient evidence.7 
In many of those cases, plaintiffs were required to present 
comparative evidence to establish how the average person is able to 
perform the relevant major life activity and how the plaintiff’s ability 
varies from that average.8  There is another line of cases, however, in 
which courts determine that “average person” comparative evidence 
is not required; the finders of fact can instead rely on “common sense 
and their own life experience” to determine if the plaintiff’s 
impairment is substantially limiting.9  Courts characterize the 
disabilities in the latter cases as plain “on their face.”10 
                                                          
 6. See, e.g., Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under Federal Anti-
Discrimination Law:  What Happened?  Why?  And What Can We Do About It?, 21 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 147–54 (2000) (criticizing a decade of court 
interpretation of “substantially limits” without any discussion of the “average person” 
standard).  The difficulties of comparing an individual to an average person have 
recently been raised in the context of learning disability ADA claims.  See Sara N. 
Barker, A False Sense of Security:  Is Protection for Employees with Learning Disabilities Under 
the Americans with Disabilities Act Merely an Illusion?, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 325, 340 
(2007) (reasoning that individuals with learning disabilities are disadvantaged by the 
comparison to the “average person” because they may statistically have average to 
superior intelligence and the substantial limitation inquiry does not look at the 
discrepancy between their ability and achievement). 
 7. See infra Part III.C.1 (detailing various decisions that rule as a matter of law 
that certain lifting restrictions are not substantial when the plaintiff does not present 
comparative evidence of the average person’s lifting ability). 
 8. See, e.g., Lusk v. Ryder Integrated Logistics, 238 F.3d 1237, 1240–41 (10th Cir. 
2001) (dismissing the plaintiff’s claim because he failed to produce evidence 
comparing his restricted lifting ability to the lifting ability of the general population); 
see also infra Part III.C.1 (describing the lack of a clear standard for the applicability 
of comparative evidence). 
 9. See, e.g., Hayes v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 17 F. App’x 317, 321 (6th Cir. 
2001) (allowing finder of fact to use “[c]ommon sense and life experiences” to 
determine if plaintiff was “significantly restricted as compared to the average 
person”); Lowe v. Angelo’s Italian Foods, Inc., 87 F.3d 1170, 1174 (10th Cir. 1996) 
(finding that “lifting is a major life activity” and that evidence comparing the 
plaintiff’s ability to lift with that of an average person was unnecessary to survive a 
motion for summary judgment); see also infra Part III.B (presenting cases where 
courts have not required comparative evidence). 
 10. See Lusk, 238 F.3d at 1240 (noting that comparative evidence is not necessary 
to defeat “a motion for summary judgment where the impairment appears 
substantially limiting on its face”); see also infra Part III.B (positing that there is little 
question that an impairment is substantially limiting in cases where courts rely on 
common sense and life experiences). 
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The best illustrations of this evidentiary dichotomy are the cases 
involving impairment of basic motor skills, such as lifting.11  Plaintiffs 
who have “simple” lifting restrictions (generally, lifting weight limits 
related to a back injury) have had a more difficult time with the 
evidentiary standards than others whose similar lifting restrictions are 
related to other conditions (such as a non-functioning limb).12  
Although sometimes couched in factual terms of the plaintiff 
presenting inadequate comparative evidence, courts go even further 
in lifting cases to rule that certain weight limitations are not 
substantial as a matter of law.13  In these cases, the “average person” 
standard is used more as a means to an end rather than as a well-
grounded substantive standard.14  No consistent doctrine emerges as 
to when the plaintiff can expect common sense to carry the day and 
when the plaintiff needs to present comparative evidence.  Plaintiffs 
may find themselves uncertain whether they can rely on their own or 
other lay testimony (such as a family member), whether simply 
supplementing their testimony with that of a treating medical or 
rehabilitation expert will be sufficient, or whether more detailed 
scientific proof of “average” is required.15 
                                                          
 11. Perhaps this is because lifting restrictions are most commonly tied to back 
impairments, which made up the second most common specific impairment alleged 
in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) filings in 2006 and the 
most common specific impairment alleged overall from 1997-2006.  See EEOC, ADA 
Charge Data by Impairments/Bases–Receipts, http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/ada-
receipts.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2007) (stating that “Orthopedic and Structural 
Impairments of the Back” accounted for 12.8% of impairments alleged from 1996-
2006). 
 12. See Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance Serv., Inc., 283 F.3d 11, 23 (1st Cir. 2002) 
(finding prior cases dismissing lifting disability claims inapposite because “[a] 
missing hand is a more profound impairment than a simple inability to lift objects 
over a certain weight”). 
 13. See Williams v. Channel Master Satellite Sys., Inc., 101 F.3d 346, 349 (4th Cir. 
1996) (holding as a matter of law that a twenty-five pound lifting restriction is not 
substantially limiting on the “ability to lift, work, or perform any other major life 
activity” compared to an average person’s ability); see also Velarde v. Associated Reg’l 
& Univ. Pathologists, 61 F. App’x 627, 630 (10th Cir. 2003) (suggesting “there is a 
threshold of severity of impairment”); infra Part III.C.1 (contending that some courts 
rely on generalized conclusions about certain impairments instead of using 
individualized assessment). 
 14. Professor Chai R. Feldblum has suggested that the substantial limitation 
analysis in general “often seem[s] to depend more on the court’s belief in the merits 
of the plaintiff’s underlying claim than on the specific effects of the plaintiff’s 
impairment on his or her life.”  Feldblum, supra note 6, at 150.  She posits that courts 
first developed their restrictive views in response to cases with flawed merits and then 
were forced to apply that precedent even to meritorious claims.  Id. at 151.  In the 
cases discussed in this Article, courts have in effect increased the difficulty of proving 
substantial limitation by imposing additional evidentiary burdens, suggesting that the 
judicial bias indeed relates to the comparative importance of the underlying 
impairment as much as to the merits of the individual’s need for accommodation. 
 15. One law review article suggests that the lack of success plaintiffs have had in 
summary judgment cases can be attributed to plaintiff’s lawyers’ failure to develop 
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Another issue is that, instead of comparing the plaintiff’s abilities 
to the full range of an average person’s abilities, some courts have 
narrowed the inquiry to whether very basic tasks cannot be performed, 
such as lifting laundry baskets and brushing teeth.16  This comes from 
a misapplication of the standard the Supreme Court articulated in 
Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams17 for determining 
what tasks make up the categorical major life activity of “performing 
manual tasks.”18  The Court held in Toyota that in order for a person 
to be substantially limited in the major life activity of performing 
manual tasks, the plaintiff must exhibit more than limitations 
experienced in the workplace.19  Rather, the plaintiff must show 
substantial impairment of all activities “central to daily life,” including 
performing “household chores, bathing, and brushing one’s teeth.”20  
Some courts have generalized this to judge the substantiality of all 
impairments, even discrete tasks like lifting.21  This potentially creates 
a catch-all “tooth brushing inability” threshold of severity that 
substitutes for the average person comparison. 
Courts have expressed distaste for becoming “glorified worker’s 
compensation referees.”22  At the same time, whether they are 
generalizing Toyota or insisting on evidence of average capability, they 
seem to be pushing ADA plaintiffs toward presenting functional 
capacity evidence similar to that used to make other types of 
impairment determinations.  Unfortunately, however, the most 
common assessment models used in vocational evaluation such as the 
Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”)23 and Occupational 
                                                          
adequate factual records.  See Jeffrey A. Van Detta & Dan R. Gallipeau, Judges and 
Juries:  Why Are so many ADA Plaintiffs Losing Summary Judgment Motions, and Would they 
Fare Better Before a Jury?  A Response to Professor Colker, 19 REV. LITIG. 505, 517–18 (2000) 
(maintaining that plaintiff’s attorneys mistakenly assume their client’s asserted 
limitations are enough to survive a motion for summary judgment; however, 
evidence is needed to put the plaintiff’s limitations in context). 
 16. See infra Part III.C.2.b (describing a judicial trend requiring plaintiffs to 
present evidence that the impairment causes an inability to do basic daily tasks 
outside of the work setting). 
 17. 534 U.S. 184 (2002). 
 18. Id. at 198 (requiring the plaintiff to show limitation in a broad range of daily 
activities in order to prove a limitation in the major life activity of performing 
manual tasks); see infra Part III.C.2.b (discussing the significance that this decision 
has had on evaluating other major life activities). 
 19. 534 U.S. at 200–01. 
 20. Id. at 197, 202. 
 21. See infra notes 202–218 and accompanying text (detailing the application of 
the “central to daily life” requirement to lifting impairments). 
 22. Pedigo v. P.A.M. Transp., Inc., 891 F. Supp. 482, 485–86 (W.D. Ark. 1994), 
vacated on other grounds, 60 F.3d 1300 (8th Cir. 1995). 
 23. See generally EMPLOYMENT & TRAINING ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, DICTIONARY 
OF OCCUPATIONAL TITLES (4th ed. 1991) [hereinafter DOT], available at http://www.o 
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Information Network Resource Center (“O*NET”),24 and those used 
in medicine such as the American Medical Association’s Guides to the 
Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (“AMA Guides”),25 are both more 
individual-focused than average-focused and more work task-focused 
than daily life task-focused.  Courts may, therefore, be wielding the 
summary judgment weapon against plaintiffs for failure to produce 
evidence that does not exist beyond common life experience and 
would not significantly help the fact finder. 
Although the ADA’s regulations attempt to spell out a criteria-
based definition, “substantial limitation” is ultimately a subjective 
standard.26  As Professor Ani B. Satz has recently noted, it is subject to 
“social influences on what one recognizes as significant life activities 
and a ‘substantial limit[ation]’ of those activities.”27  A judgment call 
must be made regarding what is different enough to be a significant 
deviation from average human experience.  At present, courts are too 
willing to assume that they should make that judgment call.  They 
should recognize that the fact finder is in a better position to make 
that call, without demanding unnecessary expert comparative 
evidence. 
Such an approach is more consistent with the rejection of the 
medical (expert) model of disability in favor of the civil rights model.  
Demanding expert testimony in ADA cases before the jury is allowed 
to determine the substantiality of limitation perpetuates the medical 
model’s focus on “individual [medical] pathology [instead of] 
externally-imposed barriers that limit a person’s access to all 
                                                          
alj.dol.gov/libdot.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2007) (classifying occupations and 
providing task descriptions to facilitate job placement). 
 24. See generally Occupational Information Network Resource Center, 
http://www.onetcenter.org/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2007) [hereinafter O*NET] 
(providing occupational information and career exploration resources). 
 25. See generally AM. MED. ASS’N, GUIDES TO THE EVALUATION OF PERMANENT 
IMPAIRMENT (Linda Cocchiarella & Gunnar B.J. Andersson eds., 5th ed. 2001) 
[hereinafter AMA GUIDES] (providing extensive medical criteria to assess an 
individual’s impairment). 
 26. If working is the major life activity at issue, arguably, the standard is less 
subjective because the regulations incorporate at least some demographic standards 
into the determination of substantial limitation.  See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) 
(2007) (stipulating that the complainant’s ability to work is to be compared to an 
individual with “comparable training, skills and abilities”); id. § 1630(j)(3)(ii) 
(including geographical data concerning job availability in the factors that may be 
considered).  Yet, a subjective component remains in the degree of exclusion from 
job opportunities that is significant enough to be considered substantial. 
 27. Ani B. Satz, A Jurisprudence of Dysfunction:  On the Role of “Normal Species 
Functioning” in Disability Analysis, 6 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 221, 252 (2006) 
(alteration in original). 
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segments of society.”28  Moreover, demanding specific comparative 
evidence in all but the most obvious disability cases leads to 
unnecessary reliance on expert testimony (and concomitantly dooms 
plaintiffs who have not developed that expert comparative evidence) 
without a corresponding increase in accuracy of determination.29  As 
this Article discusses, there may be significant issues with expert 
comparative evidence under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc.30 
While much can be said about courts’ overly burdensome 
evidentiary standards, plaintiffs’ attorneys and medical and vocational 
evaluators also need to be more proactive.  If the current return-to-
work evaluation regime does not produce evidence sufficient to 
satisfy courts that the plaintiff’s limitations are substantial, then a 
new, more ADA-centric evaluation regime needs to be developed. 
Part II of this Article considers the ADA’s requirement that 
limitations of major life activities be substantial as compared to the 
“average person’s” abilities.  The Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (“EEOC”) regulations explicitly articulate a comparison 
to an average person, but also suggest that this comparison does not 
require a great deal of precision.  Using lifting cases as a lens, Part III 
then looks at how courts have been approaching the evidentiary 
standards for showing substantial limitation.  Next, Part IV looks at 
certain assessment models used by medical and vocational experts, 
specifically the DOT, O*NET, and the AMA Guides.  While some 
helpful information can be gleaned from these evaluation devices, 
they do not necessarily lead to the kind of comparisons that courts 
seem to be demanding of plaintiffs.  Further, as noted, the nature of 
the evidence raises some interesting Daubert issues. 
Finally, in Part V, the Article suggests that courts are pushing ADA 
cases in a direction that results in over-reliance on expert testimony.  
                                                          
 28. See Deirdre M. Smith, Who Says You’re Disabled?  The Role of Medical Evidence in 
the ADA Definition of Disability, 82 TULANE L. REV. 1 (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript 
at 3–4), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=979090. 
 29. See EEOC v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 243 F.3d 1012, 1021 (7th Cir. 2001) (Wood, 
J., dissenting) (questioning what is “gained by having vocational experts routinely 
appear in ADA cases” when the issue in question is one that can be determined with 
generalized information).  From a law and economics perspective, one might 
question the efficacy of imposing the direct cost of producing expert testimony 
considering it is unlikely to decrease the error costs of an erroneous determination.  
Cf. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial 
Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 448 (1973) (articulating a goal of legal 
procedure as “minimiz[ing] the sum of error costs and of the direct costs”). 
 30. 509 U.S. 579, 593–94 (1993) (articulating the standard for the admissibility of 
expert scientific testimony); see infra Part IV.C (explaining the issues that can arise 
when presenting expert testimony to establish a substantial limitation). 
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Jury common sense should be used most frequently to evaluate the 
evidence presented in ADA cases.  If common sense does not prevail, 
however, plaintiffs’ counsel in conjunction with medical and 
vocational experts need to use the “average person” standard 
proactively, which may be one way to decrease the number of ADA 
cases dismissed on summary judgment. 
I. THE ADA REQUIRES AN INDIVIDUALIZED ASSESSMENT OF 
DISABILITY AS COMPARED TO AN “AVERAGE” PERSON 
In order to proceed under the ADA, the plaintiff must first meet 
the threshold requirement that she have a disability.31  This 
determination must result from an individualized assessment of the 
plaintiff’s impairment and the restrictions that arise from that 
impairment.32  As set out in the EEOC’s regulations, the general 
benchmark for whether restrictions substantially limit a major life 
activity is the “average person in the general population.”33  As this 
Part will establish, at least under the legislative history of and 
interpretive guidance to the statute, this “average” person is not 
based on a scientifically precise calculation, which would presumably 
need to be supplied by an expert witness, but rather on commonly 
understood human capabilities. 
“Disability” is a term of art under the ADA.  The statute defines the 
term to mean “with respect to an individual (A) a physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life 
activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or 
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.”34  EEOC 
regulations further define each of these component parts.35  Most 
                                                          
 31. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000) (prohibiting discrimination against “a 
qualified individual with a disability”); id. § 12102(2) (defining the term “disability”). 
 32. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 483 (1999) (reasoning that 
“whether a person has a disability under the ADA is an individualized inquiry”). 
 33. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) (2007).  The regulations provide a more specific 
benchmark for claims involving “the major life activity of working,” requiring 
comparison not to the average person but to a person of “comparable training, skills 
and abilities.”  Id. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i). 
 34. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). 
 35. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)–(j).  “Physical or mental impairment” is defined 
broadly to include any physiological disorder or condition that affects one or more 
body systems such as neurological, musculoskeletal, or cardiovascular, or a mental or 
psychological disorder such as mental retardation or emotional or mental illness.  Id. 
§ 1630.2(h).  “Major [l]ife [a]ctivities” are defined to include “functions such as 
caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, 
breathing, learning, and working.”  Id. § 1630.2(i).  The EEOC’s authority to issue 
regulations defining the generally applicable provisions of the ADA, as opposed to 
the employment provisions of Title I, is an open question.  See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 479 
(suggesting, without deciding, that the EEOC might not have been given such 
authority). 
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pertinently, “substantially limits” is defined by comparison to the 
“average” person: 
(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person 
in the general population can perform; or 
(ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration 
under which an individual can perform a particular major life 
activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under 
which the average person in the general population can perform 
that same major life activity.36 
The regulations then list three general factors to consider in 
making this determination:  “(i) The nature and severity of the 
impairment; (ii) The duration or expected duration of the 
impairment; and (iii) The permanent or long term impact, or the 
expected permanent or long term impact of or resulting from the 
impairment.”37 
The regulations’ reference to the “average person in the general 
population” is similar to what was articulated in the House Report 
addressing ADA legislation, which distinguished between 
“substantial” and “trivial” impairments as follows: 
A person with minor, trivial impairment, such as a simple infected 
finger, is not impaired in a major life activity.  A person is 
considered an individual with a disability for purposes of the first 
prong of the definition when the individual’s important life 
activities are restricted as to the conditions, manner, or duration 
under which they can be performed in comparison to most 
people.38 
The House Report gives the following example:  “A person who 
can walk for 10 miles continuously is not substantially limited in 
walking merely because on the eleventh mile, he or she begins to 
experience pain because most people would not be able to walk 
eleven miles without experiencing some discomfort.”39  This is the 
extent to which “average” is considered in the legislative history of 
the ADA.  The non-scientific language in the legislative history 
suggests that a finding of substantial limitation can be based on a 
common sense understanding of what is different from most people’s 
                                                          
 36. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1).  The regulations establish two sets of factors for 
evaluating the limitation at issue, one set of general factors and one set more specific 
to the major life activity of working.  Id. § 1630.2(j)(2)–(3). 
 37. Id. § 1630.2(j)(2). 
 38. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
303, 334. 
 39. Id. 
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experience.  It certainly does not suggest that Congress had an 
exacting standard in mind. 
Nor is there any support for an exacting standard in the 
Rehabilitation Act, whose section 504 regulations were used as a 
model for the ADA’s statutory definition of disability.40  In fact, those 
regulations did not specifically define “substantially limited.”41  As 
Professor Chai Feldblum, one of the drafters of the ADA, notes, very 
few Rehabilitation Act cases had raised issue as to what was 
substantial, and the ADA’s drafters did not anticipate that their use of 
the same three prong definition of disability would result in the 
demanding standards courts have imposed on plaintiffs to prove their 
impairments are substantially limiting.42 
Accordingly, nothing in the Act’s history suggests that expert 
testimony generally would be required on the issue of average and 
the degree to which the individual varies from that average.  
Consistent with that, neither the EEOC’s Title I regulations nor the 
EEOC’s interpretive materials require such testimony, except perhaps 
in cases involving the major life activity of working.43  Rather, they 
                                                          
 40. Feldblum, supra note 6, at 92. 
 41. See 34 C.F.R. § 104.3 (2007) (referring to, but failing to expressly define, the 
term substantial limitation when defining other terms used in section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act); see also Equal Employment Opportunity for Individuals with 
Disabilities, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,726 (July 26, 1991) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630) 
(noting that Congress directed that the ADA regulations be modeled upon 34 C.F.R. 
pt. 104 and that the EEOC regulations “define[] terms not previously defined in 
[those] regulations . . . such as ‘substantially limits’”).  The Department of Labor’s 
(“DOL”) section 504 regulations, which apply to entities receiving federal financial 
assistance from the DOL, define “substantially limits,” but only by reference to 
employability: 
Substantially limits means the degree that the impairment affects an 
individual becoming a beneficiary of a program or activity receiving Federal 
financial assistance or affects an individual’s employability.  A handicapped 
individual who is likely to experience difficulty in securing or retaining 
benefits or in securing, or retaining, or advancing in employment could be 
considered substantially limited. 
29 C.F.R. § 32.3 (2006). 
 42. Feldblum, supra note 6, at 92–94. 
 43. Nothing in the Title I regulations addresses what “average person in the 
general population” means.  See 29 C.F.R. § 1630 (2007) (defining many terms but 
not elaborating an average person standard).  The guidance does, however, set out 
some additional evidentiary standards for the major life activity of working.  See infra 
notes 49–50 and accompanying text (elaborating on the guidance provided for 
establishing a work impairment).  Additional sources of interpretive guidance, 
likewise, fail to establish exacting scientific standards.  See generally EEOC, A 
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL ON THE EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS (TITLE I) OF THE 
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (1992) [hereinafter TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 
MANUAL] (providing guidance intended to assist the public with applying ADA 
standards); EEOC, EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 902 (1995) [hereinafter 
COMPLIANCE MANUAL], available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/902cm.html 
(offering guidance to EEOC field investigators who are determining whether and 
how to proceed with an ADA charge). 
 2007] COMPARATIVE EVIDENCE OR COMMON EXPERIENCE 419 
suggest that individualized evidence of the plaintiff’s restrictions 
should usually be sufficient to make a determination, such that most 
cases will be resolved by reference to some kind of commonly 
understood average.44 
For example, Section 902 of the EEOC Compliance Manual 
(“Compliance Manual”) focuses on gathering information from the 
charging party and his doctor, family, friends, and rehabilitation and 
other counselors about the individual’s impairment and its impact on 
the individual’s life.45  The enforcement guidance specific to 
psychiatric disabilities takes a similar approach, explicitly stating that 
“[e]xpert testimony about substantial limitation is not necessarily 
required.”46  The examples used in these sources demonstrate that 
conclusions can be drawn directly from the nature of the plaintiff’s 
restrictions.  The Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (“Interpretive Guidance”) uses the example of a person 
“who, because of an impairment, can only walk for very brief periods 
of time” to illustrate a significant restriction compared to the average 
person.47  Similarly, the Compliance Manual’s examples draw contrasts 
                                                          
 44.  When the interpretive appendix to 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) was first published, 
it specifically provided that “the term ‘average person’ is not intended to imply a 
precise mathematical ‘average.’”  56 Fed. Reg. 35,726-01 (July 26, 1991) (codified at 
29 C.F.R. pt 1630 app. 1630.2(j)).  After the Supreme Court’s decision in Sutton v. 
United Airlines, Inc. 527 U.S. 471 (1999), the EEOC amended the Appendix to 
remove text it characterized as “address[ing] mitigating measures used by persons 
with impairments.”  65 Fed. Reg. 36,327 (June 8, 2000).  Although that sentence 
arguably had no direct relationship to mitigating measures, it was at the end of a 
paragraph right after two examples that were superseded by the Sutton ruling, and 
the paragraph was amended to remove all of that text.  56 Fed. Reg. 35726-01 (July 
26, 1991) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt 1630 app. 1630.2(j)).   
 45. COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 43, § 902.4(c)(1).  According to the 
Compliance Manual, “a good starting point for determining the extent to which a 
physical or mental impairment limits any of the charging party’s major life activities” 
is the medical documentation submitted by the charging party.  Id.  The Compliance 
Manual accordingly suggests that investigators should request the charging party 
provide copies of any medical statements that describe the party’s restrictions.  Id.  
The guidance cautions investigators not to stop there: 
[I]t is essential that the investigator obtain a statement in which the charging 
party describes the nature of his/her condition and explains how the 
condition limits his/her performance of major life activities.  In addition, 
the investigator should obtain statements from other persons who have 
direct knowledge of the individual’s restrictions.  For example, persons such 
as friends and family members, supervisors, rehabilitation counselors, and 
occupational or physical therapists may be able to describe the restrictions 
that the individual’s impairment places on the individual.  Further, the 
investigator’s own observations of the charging party may supply or confirm 
information about the charging party’s restrictions. 
Id. 
 46. EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE:  THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND 
PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES 6 (1997), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/psy 
ch.html. 
 47. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j). 
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based on common understanding of a significant restriction 
compared to the average person: 
Example 1:  [Charging Party (“CP”)] has a mild form of Type II, 
non-insulin-dependent diabetes.  She does not need to take insulin 
or other medication, and her physician has placed no significant 
restrictions on her activities.  Instead, her physician simply has 
advised CP to maintain a well balanced diet and to reduce her 
consumption of foods that are high in sugar or starch.  Although 
diabetes often substantially limits an individual’s major life 
activities, CP’s diabetes does not substantially limit any of her major 
life activities.  It has only a moderate effect on what she eats, and it 
does not restrict her in any other way. 
Example 2:  Same as Example 1, above, except CP’s condition 
requires CP to follow a strict regimen.  She must adhere to a 
stringent diet, eat meals on a regular schedule, and ensure a 
proper balance between her caloric intake and her level of physical 
activity.  A change of routine, such as a high-calorie meal or 
unexpected strenuous exercise, could result in blood-sugar levels 
that are dangerously high or low.  CP’s condition significantly 
restricts how she functions in her day-to-day life.  CP, therefore, has 
an impairment (diabetes) that substantially limits one or more of 
her major life activities.48 
Neither example looks to specific comparative evidence, nor any 
expert opinion beyond that of the individual’s treating physician. 
The guidance moves somewhat toward requiring expert 
comparative testimony for the major life activity of working.  The 
Interpretive Guidance outlines some types of comparative evidence that 
might be used, while at the same time indicating the absence of a 
required “onerous evidentiary showing:”  “[T]he terms [‘number and 
types of jobs,’ in the regulatory definition,] only require the 
presentation of evidence of general employment demographics 
and/or of recognized occupational classifications that indicate the 
approximate number of jobs (e.g., ‘few,’ ‘many,’ ‘most’) from which 
an individual would be excluded because of an impairment.”49  The 
Compliance Manual adds that when it is clear that a person is excluded 
from a class of jobs or broad range of jobs in various classes, only 
minimal evidence of job demographics is required.50 
                                                          
 48. COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 43, § 902.4(c)(1). 
 49. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j).  Although not explicit, the reference to “recognized 
occupational classifications” suggests the use of the DOT or its successor, O*NET.  
Id.; see DOT, supra note 23, at xvii (explaining DOT’s classification system, which 
groups jobs into “occupations”). 
 50. COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 43, § 902.4(c)(3). 
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To the extent there is guidance on the issue from the EEOC, 
therefore, “average” is not so much a concept of scientific precision 
as it is something of common understanding, supplemented by the 
plaintiff’s medical record or, in the case of working, general 
demographic evidence.  If the plaintiff can address limitation in 
working by showing exclusion from “‘few,’ ‘many,’ [or] ‘most’” jobs 
in a class, precision is obviously not required.51 
Perhaps for related reasons, although the Supreme Court has now 
addressed several cases defining “substantial limitation,” none of 
them dwell on the concept of “average.”  The Court has emphasized 
that substantial means more than merely different,52 but has also 
suggested that the ADA’s individualized inquiry focuses on the 
individual’s experience.  In Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg,53 the Court 
considered what evidence a person with monocular vision would 
need to present in order to show substantial limitation.  While the 
Court rejected finding monocular vision a disability per se, it 
nonetheless emphasized that it did not expect ADA plaintiffs to have 
“an onerous burden in trying to show that they are disabled.”54  The 
Court framed the needed evidence as relating to the individual’s 
“own experience, as in loss of depth perception and visual field.”55  
The Court apparently believed that such testimony of the plaintiff 
would be sufficient in most cases to persuade the trier of fact that the 
vision limitation was substantial.56 
When the legislative history and regulations are taken together 
with cases like Kirkingburg, plaintiffs should not need expert 
testimony to raise a question of fact on substantial limitation in most 
cases, beyond perhaps that of their treating physician addressing the 
specific nature of the impairment57 and, in working cases, a vocational 
                                                          
 51. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j). 
 52. See Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 564–65 (1999) (reversing 
the lower court’s decision and stating that “[b]y transforming ‘significant restriction’ 
into ‘difference,’ the court undercut the fundamental statutory requirement”). 
 53. 527 U.S. 555 (1999). 
 54. Id. at 566–67. 
 55. Id. at 567. 
 56. The Court also noted that it had “brief[ly] examin[ed] . . . some of the 
medical literature” which left it “sharing the Government’s judgment that people 
with monocular vision ‘ordinarily’ will meet the Act’s definition of disability.”  Id.  
This appears to be related primarily to identifying monocular vision as a physical 
impairment, because the Court immediately went on to state its holding that the 
plaintiff must offer evidence that proves the extent of their own experience with the 
impairment.  See id. (suggesting that evidence about the individual’s experience, for 
example, loss in depth perception, could demonstrate substantial limitation). 
 57. The suggestion that plaintiffs in ADA cases should present medical testimony 
regarding their impairments is not without criticism.  Professor Deirdre Smith argues 
that courts are too demanding in requiring that plaintiffs present medical evidence 
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evaluator addressing the categories of jobs from which the plaintiffs 
are excluded.58  For some lower courts, however, the “not onerous” 
part of the equation has been lost, even in cases alleging vision 
impairment similar to that in Kirkingburg.59 
Much of the problem can be traced to another Supreme Court 
decision, Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams.60  In 
                                                          
to “corroborate” the fact of their disability.  See Smith, supra note 28, at 27 (“Judges’ 
insistence on the presence of expert medical testimony in the record is based upon 
improper reasoning and imposes an unwarranted and inappropriate burden on ADA 
plaintiffs.”).  She reasons that this perpetuates the plaintiff in the role of patient, 
gives purchase to skepticism of individuals with disabilities as malingerers, and 
reinforces false notions of the objectivity of medicine.  Id. at 66, 68.  To the extent 
Smith argues courts often require more evidence than necessary to establish the basis 
for an impairment claim, there is no disagreement between her position and that 
advocated in this Article.  In some cases, however, medical testimony may assist the 
trier of fact in understanding the nature of an impairment.  For example, conditions 
that affect internal bodily functions might require some degree of technical 
explanation.  In all cases, nonetheless, the focus should be on the extent to which 
the impairment limits the activities of the individual, which is generally something 
individuals should be able to establish through their own testimony. 
 58. The Eleventh Circuit has said that while expert vocational evidence would be 
instructive, it is not required to prove substantial limitation in working.  Mullins v. 
Crowell, 228 F.3d 1305, 1314 n.18 (11th Cir. 2000). 
 59. See, e.g., EEOC v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 306 F.3d 794, 803 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(holding that two individuals with monocular vision were not substantially limited in 
the major life activity of seeing because they did not present sufficient evidence of 
activities in their daily life that they were unable to do because of their vision 
impairment).  Some courts have made working disability cases into a numbers 
game—the plaintiff must present specific evidence of the number of jobs available in 
the local job market and the number from which they are excluded.  See Duncan v. 
Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 240 F.3d 1110, 1115–16 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (reversing 
jury verdict in plaintiff’s favor because plaintiff did not produce evidence of the 
number and types of jobs in the local market from which he was excluded, thus 
failing to prove that the total number of jobs that remained available to him was 
“sufficiently low that he [wa]s effectively precluded from working in the class or 
range” of jobs at issue); Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu Auto., Inc., 141 F.3d 667, 675 (7th 
Cir. 1998) (accepting plaintiff’s expert affidavit after it was supplemented to narrow 
job availability statistics from entire country to local county level); see also Taylor v. 
Fed. Express Corp., 429 F.3d 461, 462–64 (4th Cir. 2005) (finding that the plaintiff 
failed to create an issue of fact on his substantial limitation in working where, 
although he showed he was precluded from 1,871 of 3,281 job titles [(fifty-seven 
percent)] for which he was qualified in the DOT, he could still perform over 1410 job 
titles, which represented over 130,000 jobs, in the metropolitan region where he 
resided).  But see EEOC v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 243 F.3d 1012, 1017–18 (7th Cir. 
2001) (rejecting the notion that plaintiffs must calculate the exact percentage of jobs 
from which they are excluded, but requiring at least some specific evidence of local 
labor market demographics).  Some courts go so far as to say that the degree of 
exclusion must be at least fifty percent.  See Smith v. Quickrete Co., 204 F. Supp. 2d 
1003, 1009 (W.D. Ky. 2002) (interpreting Sixth Circuit law to require the plaintiff be 
foreclosed from a majority of employment options available to a person with similar 
education and skill).  In effect, to prove substantial deviation from “average,” 
plaintiffs in these courts must prove that they are half as able to work as a similar 
person of their education and training.  See Heimann v. Roadway Express, Inc., 228 F. 
Supp. 2d 886, 902 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (finding twenty-five percent reduction in available 
jobs was not a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working). 
 60. 534 U.S. 184 (2002). 
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Toyota, the Court held that an individual who claims substantial 
limitation in the major life activity of performing manual tasks must 
show that he is limited in tasks central to daily living, not just work-
related manual tasks.61  The plaintiff in Toyota alleged that she was 
limited in performing manual tasks by carpal tunnel syndrome.62  Her 
impairment prevented her from repetitive work requiring her to raise 
her hands and arms at or above shoulder level for extended periods 
of time.63  The Supreme Court sent the case back to the court of 
appeals to consider her ability to do other manual tasks it 
characterized as central to daily living, such as “household chores, 
bathing, and brushing [her] teeth.”64  The Court found that the lower 
court focused too narrowly on the plaintiff’s work-related tasks.65 
It is questionable whether Toyota’s “tasks central to daily living” 
standard applies beyond defining categorical major life activities like 
performing manual tasks.  As will be discussed more fully in Part 
III.C.2.b, the fact that a task is “central to daily living” arguably 
establishes only whether the task is a major life activity, and is not part 
of the substantiality of limitation analysis.66  Because “performing 
manual tasks” is not a discrete activity in and of itself, it was not clear 
before Toyota what that major life activity entailed. 
“Manual tasks” refers to a group of activities, such as “working,” 
whereas other major life activities, including breathing, seeing, 
hearing, and arguably lifting are, for want of a better term, discrete 
tasks.67  That those discrete tasks are considered major life activities 
answers the question of whether they are activities central to daily 
life.68  Where there is a subset of tasks that make up the major life 
activity, however, additional definition of that activity’s parameters is 
required.69  This is what the Court articulated in Toyota.  The Court 
                                                          
 61. See id. at 198 (noting that, in addition to restricting the individual’s daily 
activities, “[t]he impairment’s impact must also be permanent or long term”). 
 62. Id. at 187-88. 
 63. Id. at 201. 
 64. Id. at 202. 
 65. See id. at 201 (“There is also no support in the Act, our previous opinions, or 
the regulations for the [c]ourt of [a]ppeals’ idea that the question of whether an 
impairment constitutes a disability is to be answered only by analyzing the effect of 
the impairment in the workplace.”). 
 66. Infra notes 221–244 and accompanying text. 
 67. See Samuel A. Marcosson, Of Square Pegs and Round Holes:  The Supreme Court’s 
Ongoing “Title VII-ization of the Americans with Disabilities Act,” 8 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 
361, 377 (2004) (suggesting a further distinction can be made between “collective 
categories” and “a single, discrete activity”). 
 68. See Toyota, 534 U.S. at 197 (explaining that because “major,” as used in “major 
life activities,” means important, “‘[m]ajor life activities’ thus refers to those activities 
that are of central importance to daily life”). 
 69. See, e.g., id. (highlighting the importance of this distinction and assessing its 
implications in terms of the major life activity of performing manual tasks). 
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held that a broad-based limitation on performing manual tasks was 
necessary in order for that major life activity to be, in effect, major in 
the same sense as walking, breathing, seeing and hearing.70 
That these terms need to be interpreted strictly to create a 
demanding standard for qualifying as disabled is confirmed by the 
first section of the ADA, which lays out the legislative findings and 
purposes that motivate the Act.  When it enacted the ADA in 1990, 
Congress found that “some 43,000,000 Americans have one or 
more physical or mental disabilities.”  If Congress intended 
everyone with a physical impairment that precluded the 
performance of some isolated, unimportant, or particularly 
difficult manual task to qualify as disabled, the number of disabled 
Americans would surely have been much higher.71 
Although the Court in Toyota was addressing only the definition of 
the major life activity of performing manual tasks, courts have cited 
the Supreme Court’s “demanding standard” language to support a 
generally restrictive interpretation of the ADA, including what 
evidence the plaintiff needs to show to prove substantial limitation of 
other major life activities.72  Depending on the case, plaintiffs may 
find that they must present more specific evidence to establish 
“average” than the regulations and cases like Kirkingburg might lead 
them to believe.  As the next Part discusses, only disabilities deemed 
“plain on their face” are likely to avoid the comparative evidence 
requirement.73 
II. WHEN IS COMPARATIVE EVIDENCE REQUIRED AND WHEN IS 
COMMON SENSE ENOUGH? 
When considering whether the limitations on a plaintiff’s major 
life activity are substantial, some courts have required evidence 
explicitly outlining what is “average” and how the plaintiff deviates 
from that standard.74  Other courts have suggested that the common 
                                                          
 70. See id. (“If each of the tasks included in the major life activity of performing 
manual tasks does not independently qualify as a major life activity, then together 
they must do so.”). 
 71. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 72. See infra Part III (assessing courts’ varying evidential requirements and 
concluding that the requirement should depend on the jury’s ability to comprehend 
the impairment). 
 73. See infra Part III.B (discussing the lower evidentiary standard that plaintiffs 
enjoy in “plain on its face” cases). 
 74. See, e.g., Lusk v. Ryder Integrated Logistics, 238 F.3d 1237, 1241 (10th Cir. 
2001) (explaining that the plaintiff’s evidence failed to prove that his impairment 
substantially limited his ability to lift as required, in part, because he did not “present 
any comparative evidence as to the general population’s lifting capabilities”); see also 
Snow v. Ridgeview Med. Ctr., 128 F.3d 1201, 1206 (8th Cir. 1997) (defining a person 
with substantial limitations on a major life activity as “an individual unable to 
 2007] COMPARATIVE EVIDENCE OR COMMON EXPERIENCE 425 
sense and life experience of the fact finder are sufficient to make the 
determination at least in some cases, and the plaintiff need only 
present enough evidence to alert the jury to the individualized nature 
of her limitations.75  How the line is drawn between those cases where 
comparative evidence is required and those where common sense 
and life experience is enough is not clear. 
When the disability appears obvious to the court, not surprisingly, 
that court is more likely to conclude that no particular comparative 
evidence is required.  In these cases, the limitation may be described 
as substantial “on its face,” thereby creating an issue of fact as to the 
plaintiff’s disability.76  While it is questionable to argue that detailed 
comparative evidence should be required in all cases,77 the 
substantive reason for requiring detailed proof in one case but not 
another should be reasonably capable of advance determination so as 
to avoid summary dismissal for failure to provide a sufficient 
evidentiary record.  At present, as will be discussed below, the 
controlling factor appears to be a judicial disdain of the significance 
of certain types of limitations.  There has also been a tendency to 
engage in bottom line thinking, focusing on the outcome (i.e., the 
plaintiff can accomplish certain benchmarks) rather than the process 
of achieving that outcome (which may be more challenging to a 
person with a disability).78 
                                                          
perform a basic function that the average person in the general population can 
perform”). 
 75. See Lowe v. Angelo’s Italian Foods, Inc., 87 F.3d 1170, 1174 (10th Cir. 1996) 
(finding the plaintiff’s evidence regarding her experience with multiple sclerosis was 
sufficient on summary judgment to prove substantial limitation in her ability to lift 
and no additional “average person” lifting capability evidence was required); 
Whitfield v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 2d 434, 438–39 (D. Del. 1999) 
(finding that the plaintiff’s individualized evidence that her impairments were 
permanent was sufficient to allow a jury to make an average person comparison 
without specific evidence on that issue). 
 76. See Ward v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1225 (D.N.M. 2001) 
(finding the plaintiff’s reaching and lifting impairment “substantially limiting on its 
face” and comparative evidence therefore unnecessary because a material issue of 
fact had been created). 
 77. See EEOC v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 243 F.3d 1012, 1021 (7th Cir. 2001) (Wood, 
J., dissenting) (suggesting that “nothing [is] gained by having vocational experts 
routinely appear in ADA cases solely for the purpose of testifying that a broad range 
of jobs require the ability to lift 30 pounds, or the ability to perform repetitive 
motions”); cf. Feldblum, supra note 6, at 154 (characterizing the judiciary’s approach 
of subjecting every ADA plaintiff to an individualized assessment of whether her 
impairment is sufficiently limiting as “unfortunate”). 
 78. See Nealy v. Patterson Dental Supply, Inc., No. 04-3287, 2005 WL 3132182, at 
*4 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 22, 2005) (finding that “[i]ndividuals such as Plaintiff who can 
complete the tasks of daily living by relying on healthy limbs or otherwise 
compensating for their injuries are not substantially limited in major life activities”).  
The Supreme Court’s ruling in the mitigating measures cases lends itself to this sort 
of bottom line thinking, by requiring that the individualized assessment of the 
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The best case illustrations are those in which the major life activity 
at issue is a basic motor skill like lifting.79  Lifting case decisions 
reflect a paucity of comparative evidence.  In some cases, courts 
dismiss the claim simply because the plaintiff failed to present 
evidence of average ability.80  In others, courts make substantive 
assumptions about the significance of what the plaintiff can and 
cannot do, regardless of whether the court has comparative evidence 
on which to base that assumption.81  For example, courts have been 
developing a rule that “mere” lifting restrictions cannot qualify as a 
disability, except in the most extreme cases.82 
Evaluating the lifting cases leads to two conflicting propositions.  
On the one hand, plaintiffs should develop more expert comparative 
                                                          
plaintiff’s disability be conducted after application of any such mitigating measures.  
See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 488 (1999) (concluding that 
“disability under the Act is to be determined with reference to corrective measures”).  
The Court also suggested, however, that the negative side effects of a corrective 
measure might make an impairment substantially limiting.  Id. at 484.  Finding that a 
plaintiff does not have a disability because she is able to “complete” tasks ignores the 
fact that the EEOC’s regulations find substantiality of limitation can be found not 
only when an individual is totally foreclosed from an activity, but also when it is 
significantly more difficult for the individual to accomplish it.  See 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1630.2(j)(1)(i)–(ii) (2007) (defining “substantially limits”); see also Emory v. 
Astrazeneca Pharm. LP, 401 F.3d 174, 180–81 (3d Cir. 2005) (finding lower court’s 
“focus on what [the plaintiff] has managed to achieve misse[d] the mark,” and that 
the significant difficulty with which the plaintiff completed tasks should have been 
considered). 
 79. Some might question the significance of cases involving lifting restrictions, 
on a theory that such impairments are not all that important among the spectrum of 
disabilities that the ADA potentially covers.  See Mays v. Principi, 301 F.3d 866, 869–70 
(7th Cir. 2002) (suggesting that claim was not significant because it involved only a 
back injury that impaired the plaintiff’s lifting abilities).  To the contrary, because 
lifting is such a basic human activity, like all of the basic motor functions, it provides 
a strong lens through which to view the evidentiary burdens imposed under the 
ADA.  As this Article will argue, it demonstrates how juries are best suited to evaluate 
the substantiality of such limitations because the jury reflects a pool of common life 
experience against which to judge impact. 
 80. See, e.g., Bristol v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 281 F.3d 1148, 1161 n.4 (10th Cir. 
2002) (finding plaintiff “pointed to no evidence of how much the average person 
can lift” and therefore fact finder could not make the comparison required by the 
ADA). 
 81. See, e.g., Smith v. Quikrete Co., Inc., 204 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1008 (W.D. Ky. 
2002) (holding that a lifting restriction of twenty-five pounds does not limit an 
activity of central importance in daily life). 
 82. See Olds v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 127 F. App’x 779, 782  (6th Cir. 2005) 
(asserting that “the general rule in this circuit is that a weight restriction alone is not 
considered a disability under the ADA”); Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance Serv., Inc., 283 
F.3d 11, 23 (1st Cir. 2002) (distinguishing prior lifting cases finding no disability 
because the plaintiff’s impairment, a missing hand, was “a more profound 
impairment than a simple inability to lift objects over a certain weight”); Law v. City 
of Scottsdale, No. 98-6335, 2000 WL 799742, at *4 (6th Cir. June 15, 2000) (asserting 
that “[f]ederal case law supports that a maximum weight restriction is not a disability 
as defined by the ADA”); see also Thompson v. Holy Family Hosp., 121 F.3d 537, 540 
(9th Cir. 2002) (finding a twenty-five pound lifting restriction not substantial as a 
matter of law). 
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evidence in an attempt to head off summary judgment dismissals 
based on the court’s erroneous assumptions about average lifting 
ability.83  On the other hand, what is “average” in regard to a basic 
motor skill like lifting is something inherently a matter of common 
sense and life experience.84  Not unlike the evidentiary standards for 
“reasonable person” in tort cases, the specificity of the evidence 
should depend on how necessary it is for a jury to understand the 
nature of the impairment and its effect. 
This Part first examines when comparative evidence has been 
required and when plaintiffs have been allowed to rely on the fact 
finder’s common sense as to what is average and whether the plaintiff 
sufficiently deviates from that definition.85  The major life activity of 
lifting is then examined in some detail, because it starkly illustrates 
the difficulties plaintiffs have with courts’ demands for comparative 
evidence.86  This Part then concludes by suggesting that the specificity 
of the required evidence should depend on how readily a lay jury can 
understand the nature of the plaintiff’s impairment.87  In some cases, 
this requires plaintiffs to present more evidence and in other cases, 
requires courts to recognize that the plaintiff’s claim is sufficient to 
support a common sense determination of substantiality. 
A. Requiring Comparative Evidence in Every Case 
An Eleventh Circuit case is the primary source for the rule that a 
plaintiff who fails to present comparative evidence in any case is 
vulnerable to summary judgment dismissal.  In Maynard v. Pneumatic 
Products Corp. (Maynard I),88 the Eleventh Circuit initially held that the 
plaintiff’s ADA walking disability claim should be dismissed because 
the plaintiff failed to produce evidence of the walking ability of the 
average person in the general population.89 
                                                          
 83. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (explaining that courts sometimes 
require evidence comparing the plaintiff’s capacities with those of an “average” 
person). 
 84. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (indicating that certain courts have 
found evidence of a plaintiff’s individual limitations sufficient for the jury to make a 
determination based on common sense and life experience). 
 85. See infra Part III.A–B (distinguishing courts’ varying approaches with regard 
to comparative evidence and “plain on its face” cases, where certain courts require 
only evidence about the plaintiff’s individualized limitations). 
 86. See infra Part III.C (analyzing lifting cases and their implications for “lifting” 
as a major life activity). 
 87. See infra Part III.C.3 (suggesting that a jury can understand basic motor 
functions through common life experience, and that additional evidence is only 
necessary where the jury requires explanation of a more complicated condition). 
 88. 233 F.3d 1344 (11th Cir. 2000), vacated on other grounds, 256 F.3d 1259 (2001). 
 89. See id. at 1347–48 (“Maynard ignores a crucial element of the disability-prong 
of the prima facie case:  he must demonstrate that he is significantly restricted in the 
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Maynard alleged that he was unable to walk more than forty to fifty 
yards without stopping because of a herniated disc.90  There was 
apparently little dispute about the impairment itself.91  Maynard 
argued that the nature of the limitation was enough to create a fact 
issue for the jury on substantiality.92  The court of appeals insisted that 
the ADA first required the plaintiff to produce evidence of the 
abilities of an average person in the population.93  Without that 
evidence, the court held that the plaintiff failed to make a prima facie 
case of disability discrimination.  The court explained: 
The simple proposition we clarify today—that plaintiffs must 
present comparator evidence to demonstrate their substantial 
limitations—has been largely overlooked in ADA cases.  We take 
pains to highlight this obvious and crucial element in a plaintiff’s 
prima facie case because a review of ADA caselaw demonstrates that 
plaintiffs are continually failing to present this necessary evidence.94 
The court of appeals further criticized other courts for “seemingly 
tak[ing] judicial notice of the capabilities of the ‘average person in 
the general population.’”95  In support, the court cited from a law 
review article that urged plaintiffs’ lawyers to beef up their 
presentation of the prima facie case.96  The Eleventh Circuit took the 
article’s advice and transformed it into a rule: 
We instead endorse the proposition that, “[t]o establish that an 
impairment substantially limits a major life activity such as sitting, 
standing, or walking, an ADA plaintiff must not merely provide evidence 
of her own limitations . . . . The first key is to develop comparative evidence.  
Who, then, is the relevant comparator?  The EEOC regulations 
provide that it is ‘the average person in the general population.’”97 
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit suggested that this comparative 
evidence need not be reinvented for every case.98  Rather, case law, 
                                                          
performance of a major life activity ‘as compared to . . . the average person.’”) 
(omission in original). 
 90. Id. at 1345. 
 91. See id. at 1345, 1347 (describing Maynard’s impairment and explaining that 
his employer knew about his condition). 
 92. See id. at 1349 (rejecting Maynard’s suggestion that the jury determine 
whether his impairment constituted a substantial limitation). 
 93. See id. at 1348–49 (citing more than ten cases for this proposition, 
highlighting its importance in ADA cases, and criticizing courts that do not require 
such evidence). 
 94. Id. at 1349. 
 95. Id. 
 96. See id. (citing Van Detta & Gallipeau, supra note 15, at 518). 
 97. Id. 
 98. See id. at 1350 (explaining that where such evidence has already been 
established, for instance in case law, the plaintiff will not be required to reintroduce 
comparative evidence). 
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regulations, and the EEOC’s interpretive guidance could all serve as 
sources for determining the degree of deviation from average.99  Only 
when “the necessary comparator evidence is not readily drawn from 
such a source” would the plaintiff have to independently develop 
comparative evidence.100 
The Eleventh Circuit subsequently reconsidered sua sponte its 
decision in Maynard and vacated it, dismissing the plaintiff’s claim 
instead solely on procedural grounds.101  One member of the panel 
changed her mind and dissented not only from the procedural 
dismissal but also the original decision requiring comparative 
evidence as part of the prima facie case.102  She now found the 
decision to dismiss for lack of comparative evidence “simply wrong,” 
and instead would have held that “[t]he jury’s good common sense 
and life experiences gave them sufficient ability to determine that 
Maynard’s impairment” substantially limited a major life activity as 
compared to the average person.103 
The status of Maynard’s mandatory comparative evidence 
requirement is therefore unclear.  Before the circuit vacated the 
decision, at least one Florida federal district court cited it 
authoritatively.104  Subsequently, another court suggested the panel 
purposefully side-stepped the issue on reconsideration because it 
desired to disavow its prior decision.105  Given that the third member 
                                                          
 99. See id. (indicating that a court could apply comparative evidence established 
in these sources to a plaintiff’s individualized condition). 
 100. Id. 
 101. See Maynard v. Pneumatic Prods. Corp. (Maynard II), 256 F.3d 1259, 1261, 
1264 (11th Cir. 2001) (affirming the district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of 
law in Pneumatic’s favor because Maynard did not prove that he timely filed a 
discrimination charge with the EEOC).  The court specifically noted that because it 
was deciding the case on procedural grounds, it was not addressing any alternative 
grounds for dismissal.  Id. at 1264. 
 102. See id. at 1266 (Fletcher, J., dissenting) (finding that Maynard’s condition was 
so obviously substantially limiting that the court erred in requiring comparative 
evidence). 
 103. Id.  The Eleventh Circuit sidestepped the prima facie case issue when it 
reconsidered Maynard, leaving the circuit somewhat unclear as to whether 
comparative evidence is in fact mandatory in every case.  See id. at 1264 (explaining 
that the court’s finding on the timeliness issue alone sufficed to decide the case).  A 
case decided in between the two Maynard opinions relied on the court’s initial 
decision to dismiss a plaintiff’s ADA claim because the plaintiff “failed to provide any 
evidence whatsoever of how well the general population performs any major life 
activities in questions [sic] with respect to either his claims for learning disabilities or 
obesity.”  West v. Town of Jupiter Island, 146 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1301 (S.D. Fla. 2001). 
 104. See West, 146 F. Supp. 2d at 1301 (citing Maynard I, 233 F.3d 1344 (11th Cir. 
2000), for proposition that “an ADA plaintiff must present ‘some evidence of how 
well the average person in the general population performs the major life activity in 
question’”). 
 105. See Crutcher v. Mobile Hous. Bd., No. 04-0499, 2005 WL 2675207, at *10 
(S.D. Ala. Oct. 20, 2005) (suggesting that “Maynard II took pains to affirm the lower 
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of the Maynard panel dissented explicitly to disavow the comparative 
evidence ruling,106 however, this interpretation seems unlikely.  
Another recent Florida federal district court concluded comparative 
evidence “is not necessary where a reasonable jury could base its 
decision on its own life experiences.”107 
Until the Eleventh Circuit explicitly considers the position it took 
in Maynard, the issue remains open in that circuit.  At present, no 
other circuit has pronounced a similar universal requirement.  There 
is, however, a tendency in at least some cases to treat comparative 
evidence as mandatory, at least where the evidence of disability is not 
“plain on its face.”108  This case-by-case approach is discussed in the 
next section. 
B. Allowing the Fact Finder to Use Common Sense and Life Experience but 
only in some Cases 
Rather than requiring comparative evidence as part of every prima 
facie case, most courts to consider the issue require it only where the 
disability is not plain “on its face.”109  In the “plain on its face” cases, 
the plaintiff need only present testimony regarding the limitations he 
has individually experienced in order to get beyond the prima facie 
stage.110  The fact finder is permitted to rely on “common sense and 
                                                          
court’s ruling on timeliness grounds so as to sidestep the issue of whether the 
plaintiff met the disability threshold”). 
 106. Maynard II, 256 F.3d at 1266 (Fletcher, J., dissenting). 
 107. Reis v. Universal City Dev. Partners, Ltd., 442 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1246 n.6 
(M.D. Fla. 2006) (noting that while comparative evidence is not necessary, in that 
case it would have been useful for plaintiff in order to show her limitations regarding 
temperature exposure due to a congenital heart condition were substantial 
compared to average). 
 108. See infra Part III.B (providing case law examples of comparative evidence 
requirements where a plaintiff’s disability is not plain on its face). 
 109. See Lusk v. Ryder Integrated Logistics, 238 F.3d 1237, 1240–41 (10th Cir. 
2001) (concluding that “comparative evidence is not required as a matter of law . . . 
where the impairment appears substantially limiting on its face”); Crutcher, 2005 WL 
2675207, at *11 (concluding that the plaintiff’s impairment appeared “substantially 
limiting on its face,” so no comparative evidence was required). 
 110. See, e.g., EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (Keane II), 417 F.3d 789, 802 (7th Cir. 
2005) (listing the plaintiff’s walking limitations and finding that a “jury could 
conclude, based on this evidence and its own life experience,” that the plaintiff 
suffered a substantial limitation relevant to an “average” person); EEOC v. Yellow 
Freight Sys., Inc., No. 98 CIV. 2270, 2002 WL 31011859, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 
2002) (disagreeing with Maynard II’s finding that a jury can never determine without 
comparative evidence whether a certain impairment is substantially limiting); EEOC 
v. Valu Merchandisers Co., No. 01-2224, 2002 WL 1932533, at *5–6 (D. Kan. Aug. 9, 
2002) (finding that “the facts presented regarding the nature, severity and duration 
of Kennedy’s impairment could lead a reasonable jury to conclude that Kennedy was, 
in fact, permanently and substantially limited in the major life activity of lifting”); 
Ward v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1225 (D.N.M. 2001) 
(concluding that an impairment preventing the plaintiff from reaching above his 
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life experiences” to determine if the plaintiff’s limitations are 
substantial.111  Where the disability is less obvious, however, courts 
find a lack of substantial limitation as a matter of law if there is no 
comparative evidence because the plaintiffs failed to convince the 
court that their impairments deviate sufficiently from some “average” 
norm.112  In these cases, comparative evidence becomes, in practical 
effect, mandatory. 
For example, the Seventh Circuit in EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 
(Keane II)113 allowed a case to go to the jury on testimony from the 
plaintiff, Judith Keane, that she “was unable to walk the equivalent of 
one city block without her right leg and feet becoming numb.”114  She 
also supplied a doctor’s report that noted she had “difficulty walking 
distances as short as twenty feet,” and that “the way she walked was 
very abnormal.”115  Direct comparative evidence was not required, 
because the court found “[a] reasonable jury could conclude, based 
on this evidence and its own life experience, that Keane’s severe 
difficulty in walking the equivalent of one city block was a substantial 
limitation compared to the walking most people do.”116 
By contrast, in Lusk v. Ryder Integrated Logistics,117 the Tenth Circuit 
upheld summary judgment for the employer after the employee 
failed to present sufficient evidence that his forty-pound lifting 
restriction substantially limited him in the major life activity of 
lifting.118  This was after the court concluded comparative evidence 
                                                          
head or lifting more than two pounds above his head was substantially limiting on its 
face, and required no comparative evidence); see also Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance 
Serv. Inc., 283 F.3d 11, 24 (1st Cir. 2002) (finding that evidence that the plaintiff was 
a genetic amputee combined with her testimony concerning the extent of her 
limitations in grasping things was sufficient to create an issue of fact); Lowe v. 
Angelo’s Italian Foods, Inc., 87 F.3d 1170, 1174 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding that the 
plaintiff created a genuine issue of material fact with evidence that she suffered from 
multiple sclerosis and, as a result, was unable to lift items weighing more than fifteen 
pounds). 
 111. Hayes v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 17 F. App’x 317, 321 (6th Cir. 2001) 
(concluding that “[c]ommon sense and life experiences will permit finders of fact to 
determine whether someone who cannot sit for more than [twenty or twenty-five 
minutes] is significantly restricted as compared to the average person”); Witt v. Nw. 
Aluminum Co., 177 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1131 (D. Or. 2001) (reasoning that “in 
appropriate cases factfinders may draw on their own experience to determine 
whether particular impairments constitute ‘substantial limitations’ of major life 
activities”). 
 112. See infra notes 160–165 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of 
comparative evidence in lifting cases). 
 113. 417 F.3d 789 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 114. Id. at 802. 
 115. Id. at 795. 
 116. Id. at 802. 
 117. 238 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir. 2001). 
 118. See id. at 1240–41 (finding that, without evidence of the “average” person’s 
lifting capacity or the plaintiff’s substantial limitations in his day-to-day activities, a 
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was not required as a matter of law to withstand a motion for 
summary judgment.119  The court was willing to accept the 
proposition that an impairment substantially limiting “on its face” 
created a genuine issue of fact, but was not convinced that a forty-
pound lifting restriction met that standard.120 
When courts find common sense and life experience sufficient, 
they do not seem to be saying that there is a common sense standard 
for evaluating ADA claims so much as they imply that a particular 
case appears obvious to them.  In other words, there is little question 
in the “plain on their face” cases that the fact finder will conclude the 
plaintiff’s limitation is substantial.  Keane II is one such example.121  
Another is Hayes v. United Parcel Service, Inc.,122 in which the Sixth 
Circuit reversed summary judgment for the employer, finding that 
the plaintiff was not required to present additional evidence of his 
sitting limitations compared to the average population.123  In that 
case, the plaintiff established an inability to sit for more than about 
twenty to twenty-five minutes at a time.124  The district court required 
the plaintiff to present evidence of the average person’s ability to sit, 
but the circuit court concluded that the fact finder could rely on 
common sense and life experiences to determine that someone who 
could sit for no more than that period of time was significantly 
restricted as compared to the average person.125  Indeed, it does seem 
obvious (especially to those in a profession like law that involves a lot 
of sitting) that most people can sit for considerably more than twenty 
minutes at a time. 
Similarly, a federal district court in Oregon allowed the plaintiff’s 
disability claim to survive summary judgment without expert 
                                                          
statement from the plaintiff’s doctor as to the severity of the impairment was 
insufficient). 
 119. Id. at 1240 (citing the court’s decision in Lowe v. Angelo’s Italian Foods, Inc., 87 
F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 1996), where the court found a lifting restriction of fifteen 
pounds to be substantially limiting on its face, and required no comparative evidence 
to determine that there existed a genuine issue of fact). 
 120. See id. at 1240–41 (citing other circuits’ holdings that lifting restrictions 
similar to the plaintiff’s were not substantially limiting on their face). 
 121. See supra notes 113–116 and accompanying text (examining the evidence 
provided and the Keane II court’s reasoning). 
 122. 17 F. App’x 317 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 123. See id. at 321 (stating that the fact finders’ common sense and life 
experiences would sufficiently inform their determination of whether an inability to 
sit for more than twenty to twenty-five minutes is significantly restrictive as compared 
to the average person). 
 124. See id. at 320 (indicating that Hayes participated in an occupational readiness 
program, which evaluated his sitting capability at twenty or twenty-five minutes). 
 125. See id. at 321 (distinguishing Hayes from the two cases relied on by the district 
court, based on the credibility of Hayes’ evidence and the severity of his 
impairment). 
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comparative testimony, where the plaintiff was an individual who was 
unable to walk more than fifty to one hundred feet without taking a 
break.126  The court refused to take judicial notice of the average 
person’s ability to walk more than that distance, but instead allowed 
the fact finder to draw on its own experience: 
Factfinders do not need expert testimony to understand that a 
person confined to a wheelchair is substantially limited in the 
major life activity of walking.  Factfinders similarly are competent 
to weigh the evidence about other walking limitations to determine 
whether those limitations are so substantial that they constitute a 
disability.127 
The plaintiff’s testimony regarding his limitations and his doctor’s 
report were sufficient to carry the case to the fact finder.128 
Walking, sitting, and lifting are all basic physical activities that 
readily lend themselves to a common understanding of average.129  In 
cases involving other less obvious limitations, courts have on occasion 
not required specific comparative evidence if the plaintiff’s evidence 
suggested a simple comparison to a readily-understood average 
ability.  The plaintiff in a Seventh Circuit learning disability case, for 
example, avoided summary judgment when she presented specific 
evidence about her note-taking process, from which the court was 
convinced a reasonable inference could be drawn that her process 
was substantially distinct from that of the average student.130  By 
contrast, a federal district court found a plaintiff who asserted he had 
                                                          
 126. See Witt v. Nw. Aluminum Co., 177 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1131 (D. Or. 2001) 
(finding that “[a]lthough this evidence does not compel a finding that Plaintiff was 
disabled during the last few months he worked for Defendant, it is some evidence 
from which a factfinder could determine Plaintiff’s ability to walk was substantially 
limited”). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id.  The Witt court also noted the summary judgment standard in the Ninth 
Circuit required plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases to produce only 
minimal evidence to defeat a defense motion.  See id. (distinguishing their standard 
from that of the Eleventh Circuit (citing Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis, 225 F.3d 115, 
1123 (9th Cir. 2000))). 
 129. See supra notes 113–128 and accompanying text (summarizing several 
examples of walking (Keane II and Witt), sitting (Hayes), and lifting (Lusk) cases). 
 130. Davidson v. Midelfort Clinic, Ltd., 133 F.3d 499, 510 (7th Cir. 1998).  The 
plaintiff in Davidson claimed that she had a record of disability in that she had 
difficulties focusing in the classroom and assimilating new material.  See id. at 509–10.  
She established that during her secondary and post-secondary education, she had to 
dictate her class notes and then write them out again by hand, and had to write out 
passages she had just read in a textbook.  Id. at 510.  The court required no 
additional comparative evidence, instead noting that it could “not imagine that the 
average person in the general population finds it necessary to dictate one’s school 
notes and then write them out again by hand, or to write out the passages she has just 
read in a textbook, in order to assimilate the information.”  Id.  As with sitting, the 
court’s understanding of average may well have been enhanced by personal 
experience with long hours of studying. 
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“mental and physical processes [that] are very slow as compared to 
the average person” did not provide enough of a benchmark for the 
jury to draw a common sense understanding of average.131 
The commonplace nature of the activity does not necessarily mean, 
however, that the case will go to the fact finder using the common 
sense standard.  As discussed in the next section, the cases involving 
lifting as a major life activity suggest that, in some sense, the common 
nature of the activity may actually make it harder for plaintiffs to 
convince the court that they have created a question of fact as to the 
substantiality of their limitations.  In these cases, courts are more 
likely to presume most limitations are not substantial, regardless of 
whether common sense and life experience might suggest otherwise. 
C. Incoherent Comparative/Common Sense Distinctions and the Major Life 
Activity of Lifting 
The major life activity of lifting has played a unique role in 
substantial limitation case law.  Although sitting, walking, and 
standing have to some extent raised similar concerns, lifting has 
received more judicial consideration, perhaps because back 
impairments tend to be quite prevalent.132  Courts have been more 
demanding of comparative evidence in lifting cases and, despite the 
ADA’s requirement of individualized assessment, quite willing to find 
lifting restrictions not substantially limiting as a matter of law.133 
Some courts presume that lifting restriction claims are not worthy 
of ADA protection by summarily dismissing the significance of the 
restrictions imposed on the plaintiff.134 Even as they accept lifting as a 
major life activity,135 these courts will state that lifting restrictions 
                                                          
 131. Huizenga v. Elkay Mfg., No. 99 C 50287, 2001 WL 640973, at *6 (N.D. Ill. 
June 5, 2001). 
 132. See NAT’L INST. OF ARTHRITIS & MUSCULOSKELETAL & SKIN DISEASES, U.S. DEP’T 
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HANDOUT ON HEALTH:  BACK PAIN 1 (2005), available at 
http://www.niams.nih.gov/Health_Info/Back_Pain/back_pain_hoh.pdf (explaining 
“back pain affects an estimated 8 out of 10 people”). 
 133. Infra notes 160–165 and accompanying text. 
 134. See, e.g., Smith v. Quikrete Co., 204 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1008 (W.D. Ky. 2002) 
(holding that a lifting restriction of twenty-five pounds does not limit an activity of 
central importance in daily life); cf. Prickett v. Amoco Oil Co., 147 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 
1154 (D. Utah 2001) (rejecting the significance of the plaintiff’s lifting, standing, 
and sitting restrictions). 
 135. Lifting is not listed in the regulation defining “major life activities,” but is 
mentioned in the interpretive guidance:  “Major life activities include caring for 
oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, 
learning, and working.  This list is not exhaustive.  For example, other major life 
activities include, but are not limited to, sitting, standing, lifting, [and] reaching.”  29 
C.F.R. §§ 1630, 1630.2(i) (2007).  Some courts, such as the First Circuit, have 
concluded that lifting is central to daily life and is therefore a major life activity.  See 
Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance Serv., Inc., 283 F.3d 11, 21 (1st Cir. 2002) (finding that 
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alone are not sufficient to prove substantial limitation.136  As one 
court put it, limitation on the ability to lift heavy objects is “part of 
the human condition.”137  In some of the cases, the courts conflate the 
major life activities of lifting and working.  These cases either fail to 
distinguish between working and lifting and subject lifting claims to 
the same narrow reading as working claims,138 or erroneously import 
the reasoning from the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Toyota 
Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams139 that work-related 
restrictions do not establish substantial limitation in the major life 
activity of performing manual tasks.140  In the big picture, these courts 
are insisting on comparative evidence in lifting cases, either directly 
or indirectly through rulings on evidence as a matter of law, even 
though lifting ability is something that can largely be judged by 
common sense and life experience. 
1. De-individualizing the assessment of lifting limitations 
A disability claim based on a lifting restriction alone is likely to 
meet considerable judicial resistance.  Some courts perceive a 
difference between simple lifting restrictions and those associated 
with other conditions, with simple restrictions more likely to be 
rejected.141  Others treat the issue as one of threshold—the restriction 
                                                          
“[w]hether lifting pen to paper or glass to mouth, lifting is an integral part of 
everyday life and seems to fit comfortably within the parameters set by the Court” in 
Toyota v. Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002)).  Other 
courts have been less receptive.  The Seventh Circuit has expressed general 
skepticism that “lifting more than 10 pounds” is a major life activity.  Mays v. Principi, 
301 F.3d 866, 869 (7th Cir. 2002).  The Eighth Circuit does not recognize lifting as a 
stand-alone major life activity, but only as “part of a set of basic motor functions that 
together represent a major life activity.”  Nuzum v. Ozark Auto. Distribs., Inc., 432 
F.3d 839, 845 (8th Cir. 2005).  Whether lifting is a major life activity in and of itself is 
beyond the scope of this Article, although it must be acknowledged that skepticism 
on this issue may influence, if not drive, some of the restrictive interpretations of 
cases discussed in the Article. 
 136. See, e.g., Wenzel v. Mo.-Am. Water Co., 404 F.3d 1038, 1041 (8th Cir. 2005) 
(finding that “[a] lifting restriction, without more, is not a disability”); Law v. City of 
Scottsdale, No. 98-6335, 2000 WL 799742, at *4 (6th Cir. June 15, 2000) (observing 
that “[f]ederal case law supports that a maximum weight restriction is not a disability 
as defined by the ADA”). 
 137. Buettner v. N. Okla. County Mental Health Ctr., 158 F. App’x 81, 87 (10th 
Cir. 2005). 
 138. Infra Part III.C.2.a. 
 139. 534 U.S. 184 (2002). 
 140. Infra Part III.C.2.b. 
 141. See Mays v. Principi, 301 F.3d 866, 869–70 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting that the 
case involves only a general lifting restriction due to a back injury as opposed to a 
case where “the plaintiff [is] missing an arm”); Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance Serv., 
Inc., 283 F.3d 11, 22–23 (1st Cir. 2002) (finding the plaintiff’s claim distinguishable 
from others where a weight restriction was insufficient to prove disability because the 
plaintiff had only one available limb with which to lift); Smith v. Quikrete Co., 204 F. 
Supp. 2d 1003, 1008 (W.D. Ky. 2002) (noting that “uniformly . . . courts seem 
 436 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:409 
must be greater than a certain weight threshold or the court is 
unwilling to consider it substantial.142  These latter cases give lip 
service to the requirement of comparative evidence; courts have been 
willing to rule as a matter of law that certain weight restrictions are 
not substantial even absent any evidence of the average person’s 
lifting ability.143  The individualized assessment of the plaintiff’s 
restrictions has been glossed over in favor of generalized conclusions 
about the significance of certain restrictions.144 
In some cases, courts examine the reasons for a person’s difficulty 
lifting to determine whether the lifting impairment is substantially 
limiting.  The Seventh Circuit sua sponte raised a concern that a lifting 
limitation related to a back injury is not a disability, while at the same 
time suggesting that one related to a physical deformity might be.145  
In the words of that court, the plaintiff’s disability claim based on a 
restriction to light duty146 was questionable, not because she could not 
prove the restriction, but because “[i]t is not as if the plaintiff w[as] 
missing an arm.”147  Although the issue had not been raised by the 
parties, the court wanted to go on record “to register [its] doubts . . . 
that a back injury that merely limits a person’s ability to lift heavy 
objects creates a disability.”148 
                                                          
reluctant to approve disability-in-lifting claims based only upon a general restriction 
on lifting heavy objects”). 
 142. See Velarde v. Associated Reg’l & Univ. Pathologists, 61 F. App’x 627, 630 
(10th Cir. 2003) (suggesting “there is a threshold of severity of impairment below 
which the plaintiff bears the burden of proving substantiality”). 
 143. See, e.g., Williams v. Channel Master Satellite Sys., Inc., 101 F.3d 346, 349 (4th 
Cir. 1996) (holding, “as a matter of law, that a twenty-five pound lifting restriction—
particularly when compared to an average person’s abilities—[was] not” substantial).  
There is no indication in the opinion, however, that the court had comparative 
evidence on which to base that finding.  Id.  When plaintiffs do submit evidence 
regarding their limitations, courts have still been dismissive, suggesting that 
substantial limitation requires proof of restriction of the activities central to daily 
living.  See, e.g., Velarde, 61 F. App’x at 630–31 (rejecting the plaintiff’s limitation 
evidence because it did not show substantial limitation in “his overall daily 
functioning”); see also infra Part III.C.2.b (discussing the additional evidentiary 
hurdles in more detail). 
 144. See Marinelli v. City of Erie, 216 F.3d 354, 363–64 (3d Cir. 2000) (rejecting 
the significance of the plaintiff’s evidence of limitation because the court found his 
ten-pound lifting restriction “not far removed from the twenty-five pound restrictions 
our sister circuits have held” insufficient). 
 145. Mays, 301 F.3d at 869–70.  In Mays, the parties apparently did not dispute 
whether the plaintiff’s back injury was a disability, which the court found 
“puzzl[ing].”  Id. at 869. 
 146. The plaintiff in Mays was restricted to positions not involving lifting over ten 
pounds.  Id. at 868. 
 147. Id. at 869. 
 148. Id. at 870.  The court also observed that “[t]he number of Americans 
restricted by back problems to light work is legion.”  Id. at 869. 
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Indeed, where the plaintiff’s lifting is restricted by some other 
physical condition, the court may find disability with an emphasis on 
the case not being simply about lifting capacity.  For example, in a 
case involving a person born without a left hand, the First Circuit 
distinguished other lifting cases as “inapposite” because a “missing 
hand is a more profound impairment than a simple inability to lift 
objects over a certain weight.  Such an impairment poses a type of 
restriction on lifting not shared by a significant portion of the 
populace.”149  Likewise, the Tenth Circuit accepted, with little 
question, a fifteen-pound weight restriction while noting that the 
restriction was the result of the plaintiff’s multiple sclerosis.150  A 
federal district court in Alabama found the “quantum of proof” not 
to require comparative evidence where the plaintiff’s limitations were 
the result of a paralyzed right arm, because that type of restriction 
was substantial “on its face.”151  In both of these cases, the courts 
focused on the nature of the plaintiff’s impairment not in terms of 
the limitation but in terms of how significant they viewed the 
impairment itself to be. 
In the bulk of cases, however, the debate centers on how many 
pounds the plaintiff can lift and whether the plaintiff must present 
more evidence than the individualized facts of their restrictions.  At 
times, the cases suggest a per se threshold and at other times no 
coherent standard.  The Tenth Circuit has gone so far as to suggest 
that there is “a threshold of severity of impairment below which the 
plaintiff bears the burden of proving substantiality.”152  While this 
suggests some clear line has been drawn, this is not the case.  What 
the threshold is, and when plaintiffs must have comparative evidence 
or when they can rely on individualized evidence of their limitations 
and the jury’s common sense and life experience, is not clear.153 
                                                          
 149. Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance Serv., Inc., 283 F.3d 11, 23 (1st Cir. 2002).  The 
lower court in Gillen rejected the plaintiff’s claim, in part, because the plaintiff had a 
demonstrated ability to lift objects of forty-to-fifty pounds.  Id. at 22. 
 150. Lowe v. Angelo’s Italian Foods, Inc., 87 F.3d 1170, 1174 (10th Cir. 1996).  
The sum total of the Lowe court’s consideration of the plaintiff’s lifting claim was that 
she had multiple sclerosis, a long-term, incurable disease, and as a result, was unable 
to lift more than fifteen pounds.  Id.  On this basis, the court found the plaintiff to 
have created a genuine issue of material fact for the jury to consider on the issue of 
whether she was substantially limited in her ability to lift.  Id. 
 151. Crutcher v. Mobile Hous. Bd., No. 04-0499, 2005 WL 2675207, at *11 (S.D. 
Ala. Oct. 20, 2005). 
 152. Velarde v. Associated Reg’l & Univ. Pathologists, 61 F. App’x 627, 630 (10th 
Cir. 2003). 
 153. Cf. EEOC v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., No. 98 Civ. 2270, 2002 WL 31011859, at 
*13 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2002) (noting that cases involving “the major life activity of 
sitting do not yield a single benchmark against which to test all sitting limitations”). 
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The Tenth Circuit’s decisions illustrate this.  That court found a 
fifteen-pound lifting restriction substantially limiting on its face,154 but 
a twenty-five pound repetitive lifting/thirty-five pound occasional 
restriction insufficient, at least without additional evidence.155  In the 
latter case, the court rejected the plaintiff’s request that the court 
“‘infer’ [from evidence of her limitations] that she has demonstrated 
a significant restriction on the major life activity of lifting.”156  The 
court reasoned that “[t]his evidence in fact says nothing about the 
capabilities of the average person to allow a comparison, . . . [and 
therefore] plaintiff’s evidence is insufficient to show she is 
substantially limited in the major life activity of lifting.”157  By contrast, 
the fifteen-pound lifting restriction case involved a plaintiff who had 
multiple sclerosis, which, as discussed above, seemed to lower the 
court’s expectations regarding the amount of evidence that was 
required to prove substantiality.158  Whether the Tenth Circuit would 
find fifteen pounds substantial in a simple lifting case, in the absence 
of the additional impairment, is an open question.159 
There are a number of simple lifting cases that assert a twenty-five 
pound restriction is not substantially limiting.160 But there are other 
                                                          
 154. See Lowe, 87 F.3d at 1174 (determining that a fifteen-pound restriction is 
sufficient to create a jury question); see also Lusk v. Ryder Integrated Logistics, 238 
F.3d 1237, 1240 (10th Cir. 2001) (interpreting Lowe as not requiring comparative 
evidence when the “impairment appear[s] substantially limiting on its face”). 
 155. Gibbs v. St. Anthony Hosp., No. 96-6063, 1997 WL 57156, at *2 (10th Cir. 
Feb. 12, 1997) (finding the plaintiff failed to point to facts regarding the capabilities 
of the average person). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. See Lowe, 87 F.3d at 1174 (asserting that a simple consideration of the 
plaintiff’s multiple sclerosis makes it “unnecessary to consider the additional factors 
relied upon by the district court”); see also supra note 150 and accompanying text. 
 159. A subsequent district court opinion cites Lowe for the proposition that no 
comparative evidence is needed when the restriction is substantially limiting on its 
face; in that case, the limitation was a five-to-eight pound lifting restriction.  EEOC v. 
Valu Merchs. Co., No. 01-2224, 2002 WL 1932533, at *5 (D. Kan. 2002). 
 160. See, e.g., Thompson v. Holy Family Hosp., 121 F.3d 537, 540 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(agreeing with other courts’ determinations “that lifting restrictions similar to 
Thompson’s are not substantially limiting”); Gibbs, 1997 WL 57156, at *2 (dismissing 
the plaintiff’s claim for failure to provide sufficient comparative evidence regarding 
the substantial limitation resulting from a twenty-five pound repetitive lifting 
restriction); Williams v. Channel Master Satellite Sys., Inc., 101 F.3d 346, 349 (4th 
Cir. 1996) (holding, “as a matter of law, that a twenty-five pound lifting limitation . . . 
does not constitute a significant restriction on one’s ability to lift, work, or perform 
any other major life activity”); Prickett v. Amoco Oil Co., 147 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1153-
54 (D. Utah 2001) (finding that, despite his twenty-five pound lifting restriction, the 
plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence of a substantial limitation “as compared 
to the average person in the general population”); cf. Aucutt v. Six Flags Over Mid-
Am., Inc., 85 F.3d 1311, 1319 (8th Cir. 1996) (dismissing the plaintiff’s claim for 
failure to present sufficient evidence of limitation, noting that the only evidence the 
plaintiff had of a medical limitation was a twenty-five pound lifting restriction). 
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inconsistent decisions.  One case found that a twenty-pound 
restriction is substantial enough to raise a jury question on limited 
comparative evidence,161 while another found a ten-to-fifteen pound 
restriction insufficient as a matter of law, despite evidence of 
restrictions on the plaintiff’s daily activities.162  A restriction as severe 
as ten pounds has been found not substantial enough as a matter of 
law in at least one case.163 
The willingness of some courts to rule on lifting claims as a matter 
of law is troubling.  As the Sixth Circuit noted, these rulings conflict 
with the standard of individualized determination required by the 
ADA.164  Yet, some courts seem quite willing to cite the outcomes in 
prior cases as the sole basis for ruling the plaintiff cannot prove 
substantial limitation.165 
                                                          
 161. See Whitfield v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 2d 434, 439 (D. Del. 1999) 
(involving a plaintiff who had a registered nurse testify that, in her opinion, a normal 
healthy adult is able to lift more than twenty pounds).  Whitfield is particularly 
interesting because, in an earlier decision, the district court dismissed the plaintiff’s 
claim, finding the plaintiff’s back injuries “commonplace,” and expressing concerns 
about “the dearth of comparative evidence” she presented in the case.  Whitfield v. 
Pathmark Stores, Inc., 971 F. Supp. 851, 858 (D. Del. 1997), vacated in part, 39 F. 
Supp. 2d 434 (D. Del. 1999).  In its later opinion, reversing its grant of summary 
judgment, the district court not only credited the nurse’s testimony, it also noted 
that the substantiality was “evident when one considers that 20 pounds amounts to a 
large bag of dog food or a small child.”  Whitfield, 39 F. Supp. 2d at 439. 
 162. Zarzycki v. United Tech. Corp., 30 F. Supp. 2d 283, 289 (D. Conn. 1998).  In 
Zarzycki, the plaintiff presented specific testimony regarding his difficulty holding 
heavy weights in front of him in his job as a tester and assembler, and regarding his 
inability to do normal activities like housekeeping.  Id.  The court rejected his claim, 
citing an Eighth Circuit case that reasoned “a general lifting restriction imposed by a 
physician, without more, is insufficient to constitute a disability within the meaning 
of the ADA.”  Id. (citing Snow v. Ridgeview Medical Center, 128 F.3d 1201, 1207 (8th 
Cir. 1997)). 
 163. See Marinelli v. City of Erie, 216 F.3d 354, 364 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Mays v. 
Principi, 301 F.3d 866, 868–70 (7th Cir. 2002) (raising sua sponte the issue of whether 
a plaintiff, who alleged a restriction to “sedentary work, maximum lifts of 10 pounds, 
no work at or above shoulder level, and no patient lifting,” had a disability).  The 
Third Circuit’s reasoning in Marinelli suggests that even if the plaintiff presented it 
with evidence concerning his restrictions, it would not have mattered.  216 F.3d at 
363–64 (“Even if we were to consider such evidence, however, courts have rejected 
claims of disability based on an inability to lift similar weights to those with which 
Marinelli alleges to experience difficulty.”). 
 164. Burns v. Coca-Cola Enters., Inc., 222 F.3d 247, 255 n.3 (6th Cir. 2000) 
(noting the Fourth Circuit’s ruling in Williams that twenty-five pound restrictions are 
not substantial as a matter of law “conflicts with the ADA’s directives that that the 
determination whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity must 
be made on an individual basis”). 
 165. See Williams, 101 F.3d at 349.  Although the Fourth Circuit in Williams briefly 
referenced a comparison to the average person, it did not actually look at evidence 
that set out what average lifting ability is or how such a restriction impacted the 
plaintiff’s daily activities, despite briefly referencing a comparison to the average 
person.  Instead, it noted it was following the Eight Circuit’s holding in Aucutt.  See id. 
(“Like the Eight Circuit, we hold, as a matter of law, that a twenty-five pound lifting 
limitation—particularly when compared to an average person’s abilities—does not 
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By ruling as a matter of law, these courts assume that they know 
what normal lifting ability is and how integral it is (or is not) to daily 
activity, and that there would be no comparative evidence to establish 
otherwise. 166  There is an inherent inconsistency between insisting on 
comparative evidence and ruling as a matter of law that certain 
limitations are not substantial enough.  The weight limitation itself 
seems to be driving the courts’ reasoning, not the impact on the 
individual plaintiff or a true need for expert evaluation of deviation 
from the average.167 
Overbroad reasoning is also not uncommon.  The Third Circuit 
rejected a ten-pound lifting case, for example, reasoning that the 
plaintiff’s “ten-pound limitation is not far removed from the twenty-
five pound restrictions our sister circuits have held not to render one 
disabled under the ADA.”168 There are also cases in which lifting as 
little as ten pounds is referred to as “heavy lifting.”169  That 
characterization makes it easier to dismiss the substantiality of the 
limitation.  One court suggested that restrictions on heavy lifting 
                                                          
constitute a significant restriction on one’s ability to lift, work, or perform any other 
major life activity.”).  In Aucutt, however, the plaintiff apparently failed to specifically 
identify what major life activities he alleged were substantially limited, and while the 
court notes his only limitation was a twenty-five pound lifting restriction, it did not 
specifically address lifting as a separate major life activity.  Aucutt, 85 F.3d at 1319.  
Consequently, Aucutt does not specifically hold as a matter of law that a twenty-five 
pound lifting restriction cannot be found to be substantial.  Id. 
 Another problem with some cases is that the authority they cite for the proposition 
that lifting restrictions alone cannot be a disability are actually cases alleging 
substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.  See, e.g., Rakity v. Dillon 
Co., 302 F.3d 1152, 1160 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing both lifting and working cases to 
support its finding of no substantial limitation in a lifting disability case).  Because 
working is subject to a separate set of substantiality criteria, the reliance on those 
cases in lifting claims is especially misplaced.  See infra Part III.C.2.a. 
 166. See Williams, 101 F.3d at 349.  The court in Williams justified its finding simply 
by noting the Eight Circuit had also so held in Aucutt.  Id. 
 167. Where the court focuses more on the impact on the individual, the lifting 
restriction is more likely to be considered substantial.  For example, the Eighth 
Circuit concluded that a plaintiff who had a fifteen-pound lifting restriction had 
created a jury question with evidence that he was limited in his ability to walk, stand 
for long periods of time, and bend at the waist without pain, as a result of back 
surgeries.  Webner v. Titan Distrib., Inc., 267 F.3d 828, 834 (8th Cir. 2001).  That 
court also considered a doctor’s opinion that the plaintiff had an eighteen-percent 
whole body impairment as a result of his back surgeries.  Id.  Similarly, in Whitfield v. 
Pathmark Stores, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 2d 434, 439 (D. Del. 1999), the court concluded that 
the impact of a twenty-pound lifting restriction was “evident when one considers that 
20 pounds amounts to a large bag of dog food or a small child.”  Id. at 439. 
 168. Marinelli, 216 F.3d at 364. 
 169. See Mays v. Principi, 301 F.3d 866, 869–70 (7th Cir. 2002) (referring to a 
restriction from lifting over ten pounds as “merely limit[ing] a person’s ability to lift 
heavy objects”); Ray v. Glidden Co., 85 F.3d 227, 229 (5th Cir. 1996) (characterizing 
a plaintiff who was medically permitted to lift no more than five-to-ten pounds as 
able to lift “as long as he avoids heavy lifting”). 
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were just “part of the human condition.”170  Another suggested that 
heavy lifting is a discrete task, and that the ADA does not protect 
individuals who are merely unable to perform a discrete task.171 
The First Circuit found reluctance to recognize heavy lifting 
restrictions “understandable,” on the theory that because “strength 
varies widely throughout the population,” to do otherwise would 
make many normal conditions (infancy, aging, and being out of 
shape) a disability.172  Given the regulations’ failure to incorporate 
age and sex-specific considerations in the definition of “substantially 
limits,” the First Circuit might be correct if courts were talking about 
what can accurately be characterized as heavy lifting.  According to 
DOT,173 however, jobs requiring the ability occasionally or even 
frequently to lift ten or even twenty pounds do not qualify as heavy 
work.174 
The DOT classifies jobs based on categories of strength factors, 
which evaluate the worker’s involvement in activities that include, 
among other things, lifting.175  Lifting is defined as “[r]aising or 
                                                          
 170. Buettner v. N. Okla. County Mental Health Ctr., 158 F. App’x 81, 87 (10th 
Cir. 2005); see Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance Serv., Inc., 283 F.3d 11, 22 (1st Cir. 2002) 
(suggesting that “a capacity to perform heavy lifting is not a trait shared by the 
majority of the population”). 
 171. Ray, 85 F.3d at 229. 
 172. Gillen, 283 F.3d at 22.  Although the court in Gillen endorsed rejecting ADA 
claims based on heavy lifting, it distinguished the facts in that case on the grounds 
the plaintiff was missing most of the lower part of her left arm.  Id. at 22–23.  The 
court reasoned that “[e]ven if she is able to lift more poundage than many two-
handed individuals, the manner in which she lifts and the conditions under which 
she can lift will be significantly restricted because she has only one available limb.”  
Id. at 23. 
 173. DOT, supra note 23.  The Department of Labor has been transitioning to a 
different database, O*NET, that does not classify based on weight ranges, but rather 
the degree of importance in an occupation of the ability to “exert maximum muscle 
force to lift, push, pull or carry objects.”  O*NET Online, Abilities—Static Strength, 
http://online.onetcenter.org/find/descriptor/result/1.A.3.a.1 (last visited Oct. 21, 
2007).  The DOT continues to be used in social security disability determinations.  
See, e.g., Whitzell v. Barnhart, 379 F. Supp. 2d 204, 217 (D. Mass. 2005) (explaining 
that “[o]ccupational evidence provided by a [vocational expert] generally should be 
consistent with the occupational information supplied by the DOT” in a social 
security disability case). 
 174. DOT, supra note 23, at 1013. 
 175. See id. (presenting a “Physical Demands Strength Rating” scheme).  The DOT 
defines its strength ratings regime as follows: 
The Physical Demands Strength Rating reflects the estimated overall 
strength requirement of the job . . . .  It represents the strength 
requirements which are considered to be important for average, successful 
work performance. 
 
The strength rating is expressed by one of five terms:  Sedentary, Light, 
Medium, Heavy, and Very Heavy.  In order to determine the overall rating, 
an evaluation is made of the worker’s involvement in the following activities: 
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a. Standing, Walking, Sitting 
Standing—Remaining on one’s feet in an upright position at a work 
station with-out moving about. 
Walking—Moving about on foot. 
Sitting—Remaining in a seated position. 
b. Lifting, Carrying, Pushing, Pulling 
Lifting—Raising or lowering an object from one level to another 
(includes upward pulling). 
Carrying—Transporting an object, usually holding it in the hands or 
arms, or on the shoulder. 
Pushing—Exerting force upon an object so that the object moves 
away from the force (includes slapping, striking, kicking, and treadle 
actions). 
Pulling—Exerting force upon an object so that the object moves 
toward the force (includes jerking). 
 
Lifting, pushing, and pulling are evaluated in terms of both intensity 
and duration.  Consideration is given to the weight handled, 
position of the worker’s body, and the aid given by helpers or 
mechanical equipment.  Carrying most often is evaluated in terms of 
duration, weight carried, and distance carried. 
 
Estimating the Strength factor rating for an occupation requires the 
exercise of care on the part of occupational analysts in evaluating 
the force and physical effort a worker must exert.  For instance, if 
the worker is in a crouching position, it may be much more difficult 
to push an object than if pushed at waist height.  Also, if the worker 
is required to lift and carry continuously or push and pull objects 
over long distances, the worker may exert as much physical effort as 
is required to similarly move objects twice as heavy, but less 
frequently and/or over shorter distances. 
Id. at 1012. 
 The DOT then sets out the strength requirements for each of these categories: 
S—Sedentary Work⎯Exerting up to 10 pounds of force occasionally 
(Occasionally:  activity or condition exists up to 1/3 of the time) and/or a 
negligible amount of force frequently (Frequently:  activity or condition 
exists from 1/3 to 2/3 of the time) to lift, carry, push, pull, or otherwise 
move objects, including the human body.  Sedentary work involves sitting 
most of the time, but may involve walking or standing for brief periods of 
time.  Jobs are sedentary if walking and standing are required only 
occasionally and all other sedentary criteria are met. 
 
L—Light Work⎯Exerting up to 20 pounds of force occasionally, and/or up 
to 10 pounds of force frequently, and/or a negligible amount of force 
constantly (Constantly:  activity or condition exists 2/3 or more of the time) 
to move objects.  Physical demand requirements are in excess of those for 
Sedentary Work.  Even though the weight lifted may be only a negligible 
amount, a job should be rated Light Work:  (1) when it requires walking or 
standing to a significant degree; or (2) when it requires sitting most of the 
time but entails pushing and/or pulling of arm or leg controls; and/or (3) 
when the job requires working at a production rate pace entailing the 
constant pushing and/or pulling of materials even though the weight of 
those materials is negligible.  NOTE:  The constant stress and strain of 
maintaining a production rate pace, especially in an industrial setting, can 
be and is physically demanding of a worker even though the amount of force 
exerted is negligible. 
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lowering an object from one level to another (including upward 
pulling).”176  Pulling is defined as “exerting force upon an object so 
that the object moves toward the force (includes jerking).”177  
Strength ratings are expressed by “five terms:  Sedentary, Light, 
Medium, Heavy, and Very Heavy.”178  Heavy work is described as that 
requiring the exertion of “50 to 100 pounds of force occasionally, 
and/or 25 to 50 pounds of force frequently, and/or 10 to 20 pounds 
of force constantly to move objects.”179  By contrast, light work 
involves exerting “up to 20 pounds of force occasionally, and/or 10 
pounds of force frequently, and/or a negligible amount of force 
constantly.”180  For sedentary work, the figures are “up to 10 pounds 
of force occasionally” and “a negligible amount of force 
frequently.”181 
These classifications indicate that courts have been too cursory in 
their rejection of weight restrictions.  The ten and twenty-five pound 
lifting restrictions imposed in many of the rejected cases implicate 
medium, light, and even sedentary work, which is not the heavy labor 
courts seem to think would be out of reach of the average person.182  
Indeed, the EEOC has expressed an opinion that heavy lifting is not 
self-defining, but rather, each job has to be evaluated individually for 
                                                          
M—Medium Work—Exerting 20 to 50 pounds of force occasionally, and/or 
10 to 25 pounds of force frequently, and/or greater than negligible up to 10 
pounds of force constantly to move objects.  Physical Demand requirements 
are in excess of those for Light Work. 
 
H—Heavy Work—Exerting 50 to 100 pounds of force occasionally, and/or 
25 to 50 pounds of force frequently, and/or 10 to 20 pounds of force 
constantly to move objects. Physical Demand requirements are in excess of 
those for Medium Work. 
 
V—Very Heavy Work—Exerting in excess of 100 pounds of force 
occasionally, and/or in excess of 50 pounds of force frequently, and/or in 
excess of 20 pounds of force constantly to move objects.  Physical Demand 
requirements are in excess of those for Heavy Work. 
Id. at 1013. 
 176. Id. at 1012. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Even the assumption that the average person cannot perform heavy labor is 
questionable.  The jobs listed in O*NET for which static strength is an important 
factor include such categories as general farm workers, construction laborers, and 
janitors and cleaners.  See generally O*NET, supra note 24.  For a person with little 
education, these heavy labor jobs may be the primary source of employment.  
Interview with Jack Musgrave, M.S., Vocational Servs. Manager, Evaluation and Dev. 
Ctr., S. Ill. Univ. Rehab. Inst., in Carbondale, IL  (July 11, 2006). 
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the actual demand it makes.183  Heavy lifting has instead become a 
catch-phrase for some courts, circumventing the individualized 
assessment the ADA requires. 
2. Confusing lifting with working to demand more comparative evidence 
ADA working disability cases have also negatively impacted lifting 
disability cases, although they have only some elements in common.  
The negative impact has occurred in at least two ways.  First, some 
courts lump together working claims and lifting claims without 
making distinctions between the categories.184  The resulting amalgam 
is not just confusing, it once again fails to afford the individualized 
assessment required under the ADA. 
Second, some courts have imported the reasoning from the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, 
Inc. v. Williams185 to suggest that work-related lifting restrictions are 
not sufficient to show substantial limitation in lifting.186  While some 
types of work-only restrictions might indeed be insufficient to 
establish substantial limitation, the courts’ reasoning is overbroad in 
rejecting cases solely because the evidence is based on work-related 
assessment of lifting capacity.  More significantly, these cases applying 
Toyota reflect that a type of doctrinal creep has occurred, one which 
potentially transforms consideration of every major life activity into 
one catch-all category of “tasks central to daily living.” 
                                                          
 183. See Letter from Claire Gonzales, Dir. of Commc’n & Legislative Affairs, U.S. 
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n (June 29, 1998) [hereinafter Guidance 
Letter], available at http://www.jan.wvu.edu/letters/Back_JUN_98.doc (last visited 
Sept. 26, 2007) (responding to an inquiry of whether a person disqualified from 
heavy labor has a disability by noting that an individualized assessment of the 
particular job is required).  The EEOC Guidance Letter also stated that 
an[] individual whose back impairment prevents him/her from lifting more 
than fifteen pounds is substantially limited in the major life activity of lifting 
because the average person in the general population can lift fifteen pounds 
with little or no difficulty.  On the other hand, an individual whose back 
impairment prevents him/her from lifting more than fifty pounds is not 
substantially limited . . . because the average person in the general 
population cannot lift fifty pounds with little or no difficulty. 
Id. 
 184. See, e.g., Nuzum v. Ozark Auto. Distrib., Inc., 432 F.3d 839, 845–46 (8th Cir. 
2005) (noting a line of cases where courts have assessed lifting restrictions by 
whether they pose a substantial limitation on the major life activity of working); 
Williams v. Channel Master Satellite Sys., Inc., 101 F.3d 346, 349 (4th Cir. 1996) 
(holding that a twenty-five pound weight restriction “does not constitute a significant 
restriction on one’s ability to lift, work, or perform any other major life activity”). 
 185. 534 U.S. 184 (2002). 
 186. See Velarde v. Associated Reg’l & Univ. Pathologists, 61 F. App’x 627, 630–31 
(10th Cir. 2003) (holding that the plaintiff’s claim failed because his evidence of 
limitation addressed only his work abilities and not his activities of daily living). 
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a. Amalgamating lifting and working 
There is a confusing amalgam in ADA cases of the major life 
activities of lifting and working.  As discussed in the previous section, 
some courts have concluded that lifting restrictions by themselves do 
not substantially limit the major life activity of lifting.187  Some courts 
have similarly concluded that lifting restrictions do not establish that 
a plaintiff is substantially limited in the major life activity of 
working.188  In other words, plaintiffs cannot show that they are 
substantially limited in working because the lifting restriction is not 
evidence that the plaintiff is prevented from performing a broad class 
of jobs.189  In both sets of cases, courts tend to cite other lifting and 
working cases interchangeably.  Some lump the major life activities 
together:  the lifting limitation “does not constitute a significant 
restriction on one’s ability to lift, work, or perform any other major 
life activity.”190  Others string cite both lifting and working claims 
without noting a distinction.191 
Working is, however, subject to a different analysis.  Determining 
whether the plaintiff is substantially limited in the major life activity 
of working requires comparison to other individuals with similar 
training, skills, and ability, rather than to the general (or “average”) 
population.192  Unlike the other major life activities, working does not 
proceed from a single construct based on average human ability.193 
                                                          
 187. Supra notes 125–155 and accompanying text. 
 188. See, e.g., Olds v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 127 F. App’x 779, 782 (6th Cir. 
2005) (“[A] weight restriction alone is not considered a disability under the ADA.”); 
Williams, 101 F.3d at 349 (“[A]s a matter of law, . . . a twenty-five pound lifting 
limitation . . . does not constitute a significant restriction on one’s ability to lift, work, 
or perform any other major life activity.”).  But see Taylor v. Fed. Express Corp., 429 
F.3d 461, 464 (4th Cir. 2005) (recognizing that working cases involving lifting are 
subject to individualized inquiry of the effect on the plaintiff’s employment 
prospects). 
 189. See Olds, 127 F. App’x at 782 (finding the plaintiff’s permanent lifting 
restriction proved he was prevented from doing his old job, and other jobs at his old 
employer, but did not show he was prevented from performing a broad class of jobs). 
 190. Williams, 101 F.3d at 349; see McKay v. Toyota Motor Mfg., U.S.A., Inc., 110 
F.3d 369, 376–77 (6th Cir. 1997) (Hillman, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority 
completely ignored the plaintiff’s issue on appeal that she was substantially limited in 
lifting, instead ruling solely that her lifting restriction failed to be a substantial 
limitation on her ability to work). 
 191. See, e.g., Rakity v. Dillon Co., 302 F.3d 1152, 1160 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing 
both lifting and working cases without distinguishing them); Law v. City of Scottsville, 
No. 98-6335, 2000 WL 799742, at *4 (6th Cir. June 15, 2000) (in a lifting claim, the 
court cites both lifting and working cases for rule that maximum weight restrictions 
are not disabilities). 
 192. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3) (2007). 
 193. Id. § 1630.2(j)(1). 
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There are cases that recognize this distinction.194  Where courts fail 
to do so, however, there is in effect a rush to judgment that lifting 
restrictions are insubstantial as a matter of law.  The courts do not 
seem particularly concerned about the specific parameters of the 
ADA claim actually before them.195 
Although much of the failure to make the distinction can be 
explained by a generally narrow reading of the ADA,196 there seems to 
be a particular hostility to cases involving back injuries.  As previously 
noted, the Seventh Circuit in particular has not shied away from 
expressing its concern that recognizing claims arising out of back 
injuries will result in an inordinate number of ADA claims.197  Back 
injury claims are like a specter that haunts the federal judiciary, their 
worst fear that the ADA has changed them into workers’ 
compensation forums.198  Perhaps for this reason, whether the case 
alleges a basic motor skill disability or a working disability is of limited 
concern to them. 
                                                          
 194. See Burns v. Coca-Cola Enters., Inc., 222 F.3d 247, 255 n.3 (6th Cir. 2000) 
(noting that the Fourth Circuit’s ruling as a matter of law in Williams that a twenty-
five pound weight restriction is not substantially limiting “conflicts with the ADA’s 
directives that the determination . . . must be made on an individual basis, and that 
the impaired individual’s ability to work must be compared not with ‘an average 
persons’s [sic] abilities,’ but with the abilities of a person with ‘comparable training, 
skills and abilities.’”) (citations omitted); see also Thompson v. Holy Family Hosp., 
121 F.3d 537, 539–40 (9th Cir. 1997) (separately analyzing the lifting claim against 
the general population and the working claim against a person of similar training, 
skills, and abilities). 
 195. See, e.g., Williams, 101 F.3d at 349 (holding that a twenty-five pound lifting 
restriction “does not constitute a significant restriction on one’s ability to lift, work, 
or perform any other major life activity”). 
 196. Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. 
L. REV. 555, 566–68 (2001) (observing that courts have “ridden herd” on ADA claims 
with the result that even deserving claims face a “death warrant”). 
 197. See Mays v. Principi, 301 F.3d 866, 869 (7th Cir. 2002) (observing that “[t]he 
number of Americans restricted by back problems to light work is legion”); see also 
supra notes 145–148 and accompanying text.  A similar sentiment was expressed by 
the First Circuit, who urged caution in accepting lifting restrictions as disabilities 
(despite finding lifting to be a major life activity):  “strength varies widely throughout 
the population, and if a restriction on heavy lifting were considered a substantial 
limitation on a major life activity, then the ranks of the disabled would swell to 
include infants, the elderly, the weak, and the out-of-shape.”  Gillen v. Fallon 
Ambulance Serv., Inc., 283 F.3d 11, 22 (1st Cir. 2002). 
 198. Pedigo v. P.A.M. Transp., Inc., 891 F. Supp. 482, 485–86 (W.D. Ark. 1994), 
vacated on other grounds, 60 F.3d 1300 (8th Cir. 1995) (expressing skepticism about 
“the [ADA’s] potential of turning federal courts into worker’s compensation 
commissions, deterring such courts from competently and expeditiously handling 
important, traditionally federal controversies”). 
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b. Broadening Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. 
Williams’ “activities of daily living” standard beyond manual tasks 
claims 
Lifting cases can also be used to illustrate another area of 
evidentiary confusion—namely, whether these and similar claims are 
subject to the rule set out by the Supreme Court in Toyota Motor 
Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams.199  As previously noted in Part 
II,200 the Supreme Court in Toyota held that when evaluating whether 
a plaintiff is substantially limited in the major life activity of 
performing manual tasks, it is not sufficient to consider only work-
related limitations.201  Rather, the plaintiff must show that she has “an 
impairment that prevents or severely restricts the individual from 
doing activities that are of central importance to most people’s daily 
lives,” which includes home-related activities.202 
As this section discusses, some courts apply Toyota to lifting 
impairment claims without noting the critical distinctions between 
the major life activities of lifting and performing manual tasks.  As a 
result, they deemphasize what are otherwise substantial limitations on 
the motor skill of lifting simply because the plaintiff experiences the 
impact of them more in the workplace than in home life.203  Further, 
courts appear to be developing a new, one-size-fits-all standard for 
evaluating substantial limitation, one that requires plaintiffs to prove 
inability to perform very basic tasks (what might be called a 
toothbrushing inability threshold). 
The judicial trend has been to treat Toyota as announcing an 
additional set of criteria that ADA plaintiffs must meet in order to 
                                                          
 199. 534 U.S. 184 (2002). 
 200. Supra notes 60–71 and accompanying text. 
 201. 534 U.S. at 200–01. 
 202. Id. at 198.  The Court’s use of “severely restricts” has been criticized as not 
consistent with the ADA, which requires a “substantial” limitation, not a “severe” one.  
See Marcosson, supra note 67, at 373 (posing question of whether a legislator 
considering an amendment to change “substantially limits” to “prevents or severely 
restricts” would see that change “as expanding, limiting, or making no difference in 
the statute’s coverage”). 
 203. Although lifting ability is used as the primary example in the discussion, the 
extension of Toyota has occurred in other major life activity cases as well.  The Ninth 
Circuit, for example, read Toyota to require a plaintiff with monocular vision to show 
his eyesight was severely restricted in comparison to how unimpaired individuals “use 
their eyesight in daily life.”  See EEOC v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 306 F.3d 794, 802–
03 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding plaintiffs failed to state disability claim where their loss of 
near-field vision did not keep them from driving, reading, using tools, and playing 
sports); see also Barta v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 307 F. Supp. 2d 773, 776, 779–80 (E.D. 
Va. 2004) (requiring a plaintiff who established that she had correctable eyesight of 
20/200, which qualified her as “statutorily blind” under the Social Security Act, to 
present specific evidence of how her blindness actually impacted specific day-to-day 
activities). 
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avoid summary dismissal of their claims.  For example, in Nuzum v. 
Ozark Automotive Distributors, Inc.,204 the Eighth Circuit relied heavily 
on Toyota to re-interpret its prior cases addressing lifting 
restrictions.205  In Nuzum, the court first acknowledged that it had 
before recognized “the basic motor function of ‘lifting’ as a major life 
activity.”206  The court now explained that 
in cases in which plaintiffs have established restrictions on lifting, 
we have said flatly that restrictions on lifting will not be enough to 
establish disability. . . .  If no amount of limitation on an activity 
suffices to establish disability, then the activity is not a major life 
activity in its own right.  We have said, however, that a substantial 
limitation of a constellation of such basic motor functions could 
suffice to prove disability.  Therefore, rather than viewing lifting as 
a major life activity in its own right, it is more accurate to say that it 
is part of a set of basic motor functions that together represent a 
major life activity.207 
This reasoning led the court to Toyota:  “Not only have we required 
limitations on a set, rather than on individual basic motor functions, 
to satisfy the ‘substantial limitation’ requirement, but we have 
recently applied the [Toyota] standard to such functions.”208  The 
court acknowledged that “the functions at issue were neither ‘tasks,’ 
nor ‘manual,’” but it nonetheless required the plaintiff to prove that 
he was prevented or severely restricted from performing a set of 
activities of central importance to most people’s daily lives.209 
Thus, although the motor functions listed in the EEOC definition 
are designated as major life activities in their own right, our cases 
show a finding of disability depends not on whether the plaintiff 
can perform every one of those functions, but on whether the net 
effect of the impairment is to prevent or severely restrict the 
plaintiff from doing the set of activities that are “of central 
importance to most people’s daily lives.”210 
                                                          
 204. 432 F.3d 839 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 205. Id. at 845–46. 
 206. Id. at 844. 
 207. Id. at 844–45 (citations omitted). 
 208. Id. at 845.  The court noted that it previously rejected a claim in which the 
plaintiff was alleged to be “unable to grip, reach, lift, stand, sit, or walk” because 
there was no evidence “show[ing] how these limitations ‘impacted tasks central to 
most people’s daily lives.’”  Id. (citing Philip v. Ford Motor Co., 328 F.3d 1020, 1025 
(8th Cir. 2003)). 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at 846.  In a subsequent case, the Eighth Circuit apparently interpreted 
Nuzum to treat lifting claims as manual task claims.  See Breitkreutz v. Cambrex 
Charles City, Inc., 450 F.3d 780, 783–84 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding that the plaintiff 
who alleged “regarded as” disability did not allege that the employer “perceived him 
as unable ‘to do the manual tasks central to most people’s lives’”). 
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The Eighth Circuit’s reasoning significantly ups the ante for 
proving disability claims.  The plaintiff attempted to show that his 
lifting impairment did in fact affect his activities of daily living 
because he could no longer mow his lawn, drive his manual-
transmission car, or pick up laundry baskets.211  Because there was 
evidence the plaintiff could do other daily tasks such as picking up 
around the house, washing dishes, and some laundry, however, the 
Eighth Circuit found that he failed to show he had a substantial 
limitation on a set of activities central to daily living.212 
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit rejected a plaintiff’s lifting disability 
claim, despite evidence showing she could lift nothing over five or 
ten pounds, because the doctor’s report outlining that limitation 
spoke only to work-related activities.213  The court reasoned that 
“[e]ven if [the plaintiff] was unable to lift more than 5 or 10 lbs., she 
has not presented any evidence to show that the inability to lift this 
amount substantially limits her ability to lift anything else she 
requires in her daily life outside work.”214  Earlier in its decision, the 
court acknowledged that specific comparative evidence was not 
required and that common sense and life experience are a sufficient 
basis for the fact finder to draw a conclusion.215  Apparently, however, 
common sense and life experience would not be a sufficient basis for 
the fact finder to infer how such a significant restriction would 
impact at-home as well as at-work activities. 
Other courts have used Toyota to suggest that plaintiffs cannot 
prevail by presenting lifting weight restrictions, but rather must 
address which discrete tasks of daily life the restriction prevents them 
from performing.216  One district court, in fact, suggested that a 
                                                          
 211. Nuzum, 432 F.3d at 847. 
 212. Id.  Post-Nuzum, the Eighth Circuit also rejected a case in which the plaintiff 
testified that he could only bend to eighty degrees because he could still do 
household tasks as long as he avoided a lot of bending.  Wood v. Crown Redi-Mix, 
Inc., 339 F.3d 682, 685–86 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 213. Gerton v. Verizon S., Inc., 145 F. App’x 159, 166 (6th Cir. 2005).  The 
doctor’s report in Gerton was done by a company Verizon hired for the purpose of 
evaluating employees with work related injuries.  Id. at 161.  The doctor reported 
that the plaintiff should be “returned to work with restrictions of 5 pounds, one-
handed duty and 10 minute stretch breaks every hour.”  Id. 
 214. Id. at 166. 
 215. Id. at 165. 
 216. See Velarde v. Associated Reg’l & Univ. Pathologists, 61 F. App’x 627, 630–31 
(10th Cir. 2003) (finding a twenty-five pound lifting limitation at work was not 
enough to establish that the plaintiff was impaired from performing central daily 
tasks); Harmon v. Sprint United Mgmt. Corp., 264 F. Supp. 2d 964, 969 (D. Kan. 
2003) (finding that because the plaintiff’s doctors did not specifically limit his daily 
activities, he did not establish a substantial limitation).  The Seventh Circuit may 
reflect a circuit in flux on whether the plaintiff is required to prove limitation in a 
variety of tasks.  In a 2002 case, the court relied on Toyota to hold that a plaintiff 
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plaintiff could not prove a substantial limitation in lifting because he 
could “clean his dishes, clean the yard, bathe his dog, do the 
groceries, take out the garbage, and prepare his own meals.”217  
Another suggested that the plaintiff needed to present evidence of an 
inability to “brush[] his teeth or otherwise car[e] for himself.”218  By 
contrast, another district court found the plaintiff created a genuine 
issue of material fact when she presented evidence of specific 
limitations in her daily life, namely, cooking, cleaning, shopping, 
driving, and other activities.219 
If Toyota indeed applies, these decisions are arguably consistent 
with the standard the Court articulated.  As Professor Samuel 
Marcosson has noted, the Court in Toyota “frame[d] the inquiry not 
in terms of what activities the individual cannot do or is substantially 
limited in doing . . . but in terms of what the person can still do.”220  
                                                          
failed to state a claim as a matter of law because his evidence addressed only a 
doctor’s restriction that he be returned to work only if there was no lifting.  Mack v. 
Great Dane Trailers, 308 F.3d 776, 781–82 (7th Cir. 2002).  According to that court, 
[t]here may well be cases in which, because of the nature of the impairment, 
one could, from the work-restriction alone, infer a broader limitation on a 
major life activity.  An inability to lift even a pencil on the job might suggest 
an inability to lift a toothbrush, for example, or to otherwise care for 
oneself—or at least might support an inference that the employer believed 
the employee was so limited.  But the work restriction in this case was not 
nearly of that nature, and instead fits neatly into the sort of occupation-
specific limitation at issue in Toyota. 
Id. at 781; see Moskerc v. Am. Air Lines, Inc., No. 02 C 710, 2004 WL 1354521, at *3 
(N.D. Ill. May 11, 2004) (citing the central functions discussion in Mack, 380 F.3d at 
781, for the proposition that the ADA was intended to limit coverage to individuals 
“that cannot find other productive work because the impairment is so limiting in his 
life”); Gilbert v. Indianapolis Pub. Sch. Dep’t of Transp., No. IP 00-1799-C-T/K, 2002 
WL 31968235, at *5 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 5, 2002) (suggesting Mack may require applying 
Toyota’s daily tasks analysis to working claims as well).  Subsequently, in a walking 
disability case, a different panel found Toyota limited to performance of manual 
tasks: 
The ability of a person who is wheelchair-bound to wash his face or pick up 
around the house does not indicate that he is not disabled under the ADA, 
and it would not relieve his employer of the obligation to install a ramp or 
reasonably accommodate his limitations in other ways. 
EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (Keane II), 417 F.3d 789, 801 (7th Cir. 2005).  
Whether the reasoning in Keane II supersedes that in Mack, or whether the Seventh 
Circuit will apply disparate standards to walking and lifting, remains to be seen. 
 217. Soler v. Tyco Elecs., Inc., 268 F. Supp. 2d 97, 107 (D.P.R. 2003). 
 218. Moskerc, 2004 WL 1354521, at *4. 
 219. EEOC v. Valu Merchs. Co., No. 01-2224, 2002 WL 1932533, at *6 (D. Kan. 
Aug. 9, 2002).  Even when there is evidence these tasks are limited or even totally 
foreclosed, however, at least one court has suggested that if the plaintiff can get 
someone else to do them (in that case, his wife), the plaintiff is not substantially 
limited in a major life activity.  See Verhoff v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., No. 
3:05CV7277, 2006 WL 3304179, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 13, 2006).  Verhoff raises an 
interesting question about what should be considered a mitigating measure, 
discussion of which is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 220. Marcosson, supra note 67, at 375. 
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But Toyota probably does not apply, at least the way the courts are 
using it.  While the Supreme Court in Toyota likely intended to state a 
general standard for identifying major life activities when it defined 
them as tasks “central to daily living,”221 there is no indication the 
Court intended that case’s particular functional analysis to extend 
beyond the performance of manual tasks.  In other words, the Court 
was not announcing a toothbrushing inability threshold for 
substantiality in all ADA cases. 
This is revealed by reading Toyota as a whole.  The plaintiff alleged 
not only that she was substantially limited in performing manual 
tasks, but also in the separate activities of housework, gardening, 
playing with her children, lifting, and working.222  After the district 
court granted the employer summary judgment on all her claims, she 
appealed only manual tasks, lifting, and working.223  The court of 
appeals granted the plaintiff partial summary judgment on the 
manual tasks claim, and side-stepped addressing any of her other 
claims.224  The Supreme Court explicitly stated it was considering only 
the manual tasks claim, the remainder of her claims being preserved 
by her appeal in the court below.225 
Accordingly, the case presented manual tasks, working, and lifting 
as separate major life activities, and the Court took pains to note that 
it was articulating a standard only for “the specific major life activity 
of performing manual tasks.”226  In fact, a close reading of Toyota 
shows that the Court’s main concern was the possibility that a plaintiff 
could use manual tasks to circumvent the standards the Court 
previously articulated for working. 
Both “manual tasks” and working are classes of tasks rather than 
discrete tasks in and of themselves like other activities identified in 
the regulations (such as breathing, seeing, walking).227  In Sutton v. 
United Air Lines, Inc.,228 the Court interpreted working to require that 
plaintiffs show that they are “unable to work in a broad class of 
                                                          
 221. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002). 
 222. Id. at 190. 
 223. Id. at 191. 
 224. Id. at 192. 
 225. Id. at 192–93. 
 226. Id. at 196. 
 227. Another class of tasks example in the regulations would be caring for oneself.  
See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2007); see also Reg’l Econ. Cmty. Action Program, Inc. v. 
City of Middletown, 294 F.3d 35, 47 (2d Cir. 2002) (defining caring for oneself to 
“encompass[] normal activities of daily living; including feeding oneself, driving, 
grooming, and cleaning home”). 
 228. 527 U.S. 471 (1999). 
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jobs”229 or a “broad range of jobs,’ rather than a specific job.”230  The 
court of appeals in Toyota adopted a similar class-based analysis for 
manual tasks (i.e., whether the plaintiff was limited in “a ‘class’ of 
manual activities affecting the ability to perform tasks at work”).231  
The Supreme Court in Toyota found this “circumvented” Sutton, 
reasoning that “Sutton’s restriction on claims of disability based on a 
substantial limitation in working [would] be rendered meaningless 
because an inability to perform a specific job always can be recast as 
an inability to perform a ‘class’ of tasks associated with that specific 
job.”232  Further, and “[e]ven more critically, the manual tasks unique 
to any particular job are not necessarily important parts of most 
people’s lives.  As a result, occupation-specific tasks may have only 
limited relevance to the manual task inquiry.”233 
Therefore, Toyota rejects reliance on occupation-specific tasks to 
establish substantial limitation only to the extent that those tasks do 
not mirror non-working tasks.  In daily life, individuals rarely perform 
the kinds of manual tasks that the plaintiff in Toyota was restricted 
from performing—repetitive use of hands and arms lifted above the 
shoulders.  That is much less true for lifting.  There may be some 
idiosyncratic lifting-related movements that might not be reflected in 
daily living,234 and courts may have a point about the insufficiency of 
restrictions in those idiosyncratic cases.  Basic lifting in itself is 
generally the same, however, whether performed at home or at 
work.235  The equivalency can be seen in this First Circuit observation:  
                                                          
 229. Id. at 491.  The EEOC regulations use slightly different language, requiring 
significant restriction in a “class of jobs,” not a “broad class of jobs.”  29 C.F.R. 
§ 1630.2(j)(3)(i). 
 230. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 200 (quoting Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 
471, 492 (1999)); see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i). 
 231. See Williams v. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc., 224 F.3d 840, 843 (6th Cir. 
2000), rev’d, 534 U.S. 184 (2002). 
 232. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 200-01. 
 233. Id. at 201. 
 234. See, e.g., Pryor v. Trane Co., 138 F.3d 1024, 1026–27 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding 
against a plaintiff who could not lift from shoulder overhead, whose push and pull 
ability was limited, and whose doctor testified that “her activities of daily living are 
100%”); Dutcher v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 53 F.3d 723, 726 & n.11 (5th Cir. 1995) 
(affirming a judgment against a plaintiff who could not do heavy lifting, repetitive 
rotational movements, had trouble picking up little things from the floor, holding 
things real high or real tight for long periods of time, and turning a car’s ignition).  
But see Ward v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1225 (D.N.M. 2001) 
(finding plaintiff’s restriction from all repetitive or greater than two-pound overhead 
lifting absolute and therefore substantially limiting on its face). 
 235. See Frix v. Fla. Tile Indus., Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1027, 1034 (N.D. Ga. 1997) 
(finding that inability to lift more than twenty-five pounds disqualified the plaintiff 
from a class of jobs involving medium and heavy work because the lifting was not 
idiosyncratic to his job; it was a restriction on lifting any object over twenty-five 
pounds). 
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“Whether lifting pen to paper or glass to mouth, lifting is an integral 
part of everyday life.”236 
For example, work-related lifting that involves lifting items from 
ground level to place them on shelving has a parallel in the home-
related lifting of a small child or a large bag of dog food.237  Other 
groceries, laundry, household furniture, and equipment are also 
items lifted in the same fashion as objects weighing similar amounts 
at work, as a matter of common sense.  While lifting very heavy items 
(fifty pounds or more) arguably might not be common in daily life, 
lifting twenty to twenty-five pound items would certainly seem to be, 
as demonstrated by the foregoing list.238  Recognizing the 
substantiality of these lifting restrictions would not present the same 
end-run around the major life activity of working.  The individual 
may have more opportunities to engage in lifting in the workplace 
and thereby experience difficulties more often at work than at home, 
but the significance of the activity is the touchstone, not where and 
when it is conducted.239 
Lifting claims have nonetheless been rejected, even in cases with 
restrictions as severe as five-to-ten pounds, merely because the 
plaintiff demonstrated her restriction in the context of her work 
activity and did not, for whatever reason, go into detail about 
everyday activities.240  This makes no more sense than requiring that, 
in order to state an ADA claim of disability, individuals using 
wheelchairs must establish that they have as much difficulty getting 
around their own houses as they do their workplaces.241  Further, it 
raises the question whether individuals who use wheelchairs would 
                                                          
 236. Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance Serv., Inc., 283 F.3d 11, 21 (1st Cir. 2002). 
 237. See Whitfield v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 2d 434, 439 (D. Del. 1999) 
(describing the nature of the plaintiff’s twenty-pound lifting restriction “evident 
when one considers that 20 pounds amounts to a large bag of dog food or a small 
child”). 
 238. See id.; see also Guidance Letter, supra note 183 (noting that “the average 
person in the general population can lift fifteen pounds with little or no difficulty”). 
 239. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 638 (1998).  In Bragdon, the Court had 
to decide whether reproduction was a major life activity under the ADA.  Id.  The 
Court reasoned that in order to determine whether an activity is “major,” the activity 
must be evaluated based on its significance.  Id.  The Court rejected the petitioner’s 
argument that an activity had to fall in the public, economic, or daily dimension in 
order to be considered major.  Id. 
 240. See Gerton v. Verizon S., Inc., 145 F. App’x 159, 166 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding 
that even if the plaintiff “was unable to lift more than 5 or 10 lbs., she has not 
presented any evidence to show that the inability to lift this amount substantially 
limits her ability to lift anything else she requires in her daily life outside work”). 
 241. See EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (Keane II), 417 F.3d 789, 801 (7th Cir. 
2005) (noting that an employer is not off the hook for accommodating an employee 
who uses a wheelchair simply because that employee is able to perform various 
activities at home). 
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fail to prove substantial limitation if they did not show they cannot do 
basic household chores and personal hygiene tasks.242  The lower 
courts’ reasoning makes “central to daily living” a homogenous, 
catch-all standard applicable  to all determinations of disability. 
“Central to daily living” defines the major life activity itself, not the 
substantiality of the limitation.243  If lifting is recognized as a major life 
activity, it is by definition a task central to daily living.244  The question 
then becomes, what is an average person’s lifting ability and does the 
plaintiff’s ability vary significantly from that?  Where the restrictions 
manifest themselves most prominently is beside the point.  
Individualized assessment is the appropriate approach, not ruling as a 
matter of law that certain weight restrictions are not substantial, or 
that work-related evidence of lifting restrictions cannot prove 
substantial limitation because the evidence does not address tasks 
central to daily living. 
3. Failing to recognize common sense and life experience of the fact finder as 
the most appropriate judge of basic motor skill limitations 
From the foregoing analysis, the following two rules can be 
gleaned:  (1) weight restrictions above some yet-undecided threshold 
require comparative evidence of the average person’s lifting ability, 
and (2) plaintiffs need specific proof of the impact of the restrictions 
on the activities of daily living.  Yet, lifting along with other basic 
motor functions seems easily understood through common life 
experience.  Expert evidence may in some cases be needed to 
establish the parameters of the limitation, but beyond that, it really 
should not be necessary to develop expert evidence of the average 
person’s ability or of how the limitation impacts specific tasks of daily 
living if there is other evidence of impact. 
That courts are applying per se rules rather than sending cases to 
the jury should not come as a surprise.  The judiciary has expressed 
concern about the legion of back injury cases it believes to be out 
                                                          
 242. Cf. Marcosson, supra note 67, at 377 (asserting that “when the major life 
activity in which the plaintiff claims to be substantially limited is a single, discrete 
activity[,] . . . there is no reason to examine unrelated activities the plaintiff can 
perform without substantial limitation”). 
 243. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002) 
(discussing major life activities as central to daily life and then explaining a 
substantial limitation); see also supra notes 17–20 (explaining the Toyota standard). 
 244. As articulated in the Interpretive Guidance, major life activities by definition are 
“basic activities” the average person in the general population can perform with little 
or no difficulty.  29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2007). 
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there.245  To some extent, the problem also lies with the way plaintiffs 
present their cases.  For example, in one case, the plaintiff’s doctor 
pronounced the plaintiff’s “activities of daily living” to be “100%.”246  
In another, when asked, the plaintiff apparently could not come up 
with more than golfing as something in his daily life that he was 
restricted from doing because of his impairment.247  In yet another, 
the plaintiff presented only the categories of jobs she could perform 
under the DOT (light and selected medium work) and asked the 
court to “infer” significant limitation from that alone (i.e., without 
explaining how it related to general capabilities).248  Two plaintiffs in 
a case alleging lifting and standing limitations could testify only 
vaguely that they could not sit in one place “too long” or lift 
“anything heavy” or “very heavy.”249 
Other cases, however, reject claims with sufficient evidence to 
trigger common sense evaluation of the plaintiff’s limitations.  One 
plaintiff testified that he could not mow his lawn and could not do 
“normal little things” like picking up a laundry basket and working 
on his and his sons’ cars,250 but the court discounted that testimony 
because it did not demonstrate limitation on tasks the court deemed 
central enough.251  Similarly, another case found insufficient evidence 
regarding a plaintiff who was subject to a company doctor’s order not 
                                                          
 245. See Mays v. Principi, 301 F.3d 866, 869 (7th Cir. 2002) (“The number of 
Americans restricted by back problems to light work is legion.  They are not 
disabled.”).  The Seventh Circuit has raised similar concerns in non-lifting cases 
where the plaintiff’s limitations stem from back injuries.  For example, that court 
rejected a claim by a plaintiff who could not stand for more than thirty-to-forty 
minutes without having to sit or lie down, due to a spinal injury, reasoning that “all 
persons impaired by virtue of common afflictions cannot be disabled.”  Williams v. 
Excel Foundry & Mach., Inc., 489 F.3d 309, 311 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 246. Pryor v. Trane Co., 138 F.3d 1024, 1027 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 247. Moskerc v. Am. Air Lines, Inc., No. 02 C 710, 2004 WL 1354521, at *4 (N.D. 
Ill. May 11, 2004). 
 248. Gibbs v. St. Anthony Hosp., No. 96-6063, 1997 WL 57156, at *2 (10th Cir. 
Feb. 12, 1997). 
 249. Colwell v. Suffolk County Police Dep’t, 158 F.3d 635, 644 (2d Cir. 1998).  
Along analogous lines, a plaintiff in a walking case apparently did not clean up an 
inconsistency between two statements by his doctor, one that he could walk only one 
block without rest and another that he could jog “for only fifteen minutes.”  Penny v. 
United Parcel Serv., 128 F.3d 408, 416 (6th Cir. 1997).  Another plaintiff who 
claimed a walking disability failed to convince a court that noted that the plaintiff 
had not obtained a handicapped parking permit.  See Wood v. Crown Redi-Mix, Inc., 
339 F.3d 682, 685 (8th Cir. 2003) (acknowledging the plaintiff’s ability to walk was 
limited, but finding that requiring rest after a quarter-mile walk did not demonstrate 
a severe walking restriction). 
 250. Nuzum v. Ozark Auto. Distrib., Inc., 432 F.3d 839, 841–42 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 251. Id. at 847.  The Eighth Circuit requires the plaintiff’s limitation be on a set of 
activities central to daily living, which the court apparently views as “helping out 
around the house, doing dishes, tidying up, and doing laundry.”  See id. (rejecting 
that mowing the lawn and driving a manual transmission car are central activities to 
daily living). 
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to lift more than ten pounds, not to use her right hand, and to take a 
five-to-ten minute break every hour until cleared by that doctor.252  
The court refused to assume a five-to-ten pound lifting restriction 
would affect any activities outside of the workplace despite the extent 
that the limitation speaks for itself.253 
These cases do not follow the general ADA summary judgment 
standard that requires the plaintiff to present “some evidence” of the 
substantiality of his impairment.254  As one court put it, “some 
evidence” requires only “enough [evidence] about [the] disability so 
the fact finder is not left speculating about how substantial [the] 
limitations really are compared to the ‘average person.’”255  That 
standard would not require comparative evidence in the sense of an 
expert who describes average lifting ability and then compares the 
plaintiff’s ability to that average.  Any such expert testimony would 
not add much that is not already understood by the fact finder.  
Rather, “some evidence” in this context should be understood to 
mean evidence of the scope of the lifting restriction as experienced 
by the plaintiff.  This is in effect the standard articulated by the 
Supreme Court in Kirkingburg.256 
                                                          
 252. Gerton v. Verizon S., Inc., 145 F. App’x 159, 161, 165–68 (6th Cir. 2005).  
The plaintiff in Gerton asked the court to infer that because of the extent of the 
limitations imposed by the company doctor, she would be also be unable to perform 
any lifting activities in her daily life outside of work.  Id. at 165.  The court refused to 
do so, apparently because the medical records did not explicitly show that she had 
been asked to demonstrate her lifting ability.  See id. at 165–66 (stating that the 
plaintiff provided no evidence that she was unable to care for herself). 
 253. Id. at 166–67.  The plaintiff in Gerton may well have thought, given the nature 
of her restrictions, it was unnecessary to develop detailed evidence of what tasks she 
could and could not do. 
 254. See Duncan v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 240 F.3d 1110, 1115–16 (D.C. 
Cir. 2001) (concluding in a working disability case that the plaintiff has “to produce 
some evidence of the number and types of jobs in the local employment market”); 
Davidson v. Midelfort Clinic, Ltd., 133 F.3d 499, 507 (7th Cir. 1998) (reasoning in a 
working disability case that the evidentiary burden is “not an onerous requirement, 
but it does require at least some evidence from which one might infer that Davidson 
faced ‘significant restrictions’ in her ability” to work); Gallegos v. Swift & Co., 237 
F.R.D. 633, 649 (D. Colo. 2006) (requiring in a lifting disability case that there be 
“some evidence of a substantial impairment in lifting”); Almond v. Westchester 
County Dep’t. of Corr., 425 F. Supp. 2d 394, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (requiring in a 
“regarded as” case that plaintiff “introduce some evidence tending to establish . . . 
the perceived impairment would limit [the] plaintiff in the performance of some 
major life activity”); see also Witt v. Nw. Aluminum Co., 177 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1131 
(D. Ore. 2001) (interpreting the ADA in a walking disability case to require plaintiffs 
to produce only “minimal evidence” to withstand a summary judgment motion). 
 255. Huizenga v. Elkay Mfg., No. 99 C 50287, 2001 WL 640973, at *6 (N.D. Ill. 
June 5, 2001). 
 256. See Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 567 (1999) (stating that 
persons claiming ADA protection must “prove a disability by offering evidence that 
the extent of the limitation in terms of their own experience . . . is substantial”); see 
also supra notes 53–56 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s evidentiary 
requirement for substantial limitation). 
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In other words, to prove substantial limitation, the plaintiff must 
testify to the limitations she personally experiences.257  A doctor’s 
testimony may clarify the medical basis of the impairment and, for 
less understood physical or mental impairments, explain how the 
impairment affects the plaintiff’s abilities.258  If the fact finder is 
permitted to use common sense and life experience, the foregoing 
would be sufficient evidence on which to judge whether the 
limitation is substantial.  Following that standard, the testimony of 
one plaintiff who could not mow his lawn or lift a laundry basket and 
that of another plaintiff who was precluded from lifting more than 
ten pounds or using her right hand provided “some evidence” of 
their limitations.  That evidence was certainly enough for a jury to 
judge on common sense and life experience whether, as a whole, 
they added up to a substantial limitation as compared to average 
human experience. 
Here is where the failure to distinguish between work and lifting in 
major life activity analysis has the most significance.  According to the 
Title I regulations, determining the degree of limitation on the major 
life activity of working requires comparison to a cohort, a person of 
similar skills, training, and experience.259  The extent of job 
opportunities within the plaintiff’s cohort and the extent to which his 
impairment impacts those opportunities may not be something of 
common understanding.  For example, how many jobs require lifting 
more than twenty-five pounds?  What is the relationship between jobs 
with lifting demands and the skills, training, and experience of the 
plaintiff?  Vocational experts or others who can speak specifically to 
job abilities and job opportunities for the plaintiff and his cohorts 
might be needed, depending on the circumstances of the case.260  By 
                                                          
 257. More than identification of the alleged impairment is required; there must 
also be evidence of how the impairment actually affects the plaintiff.  See Harmon v. 
Sprint United Mgmt. Corp., 264 F. Supp. 2d 964, 969 (D. Kan. 2003) (finding that 
the plaintiff apparently failed to present any evidence of “the nature, severity, or 
duration of his impairments”). 
 258. While most disability cases will involve impairments with limitations that will 
be readily understood, there is the possibility that some might require additional 
medical understanding beyond that of the average layperson.  For example, consider 
some diseases of the kidneys that impair the major life activity of eliminating bodily 
waste.  In these cases, the physician might also be required to testify about how the 
impairment affects the plaintiff’s major life activity.  For more discussion of this 
point, see infra notes 305–306 and accompanying text. 
 259. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (2007) (directing comparison to “the average 
person having comparable training, skills, and abilities”). 
 260. Even in working disability claims, however, vocational experts are not 
required.  See Duncan v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 240 F.3d 1110, 1115–17 
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (reasoning that while the ADA requires the plaintiff to produce 
some evidence of the number and type of jobs from which he is excluded because of 
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contrast, determining the degree of limitation on the major life 
activity of a basic motor skill is not subject to this same need for 
cohort evidence. 
Ideally, when proving a lifting disability, the plaintiff would speak 
to both work and home limitations.261  When courts reject ADA claims 
because the evidence of the restriction comes from workplace 
activities, this suggests that they believe the restrictions are purely 
contextual, that these plaintiffs go home at night and their 
restrictions disappear.  These courts envision the ADA plaintiff as 
someone who is so impaired as to have an exceptionally diminished 
quality of life across the board. 
But the ADA does not require that plaintiffs have an exceptionally 
limited quality of life, only that a particular impairment substantially 
limits a particular major life activity.262  If the average person can 
perform a basic motor skill without limitation, a person who has 
restrictions on that motor skill should be able to show substantial 
limitation regardless of where the restriction has its most impact, 
work or home.  The common-sense and life-experience standard best 
reflects the socially influenced nature of what is substantial.  Juries 
have sufficient understanding of basic motor skills to define whether 
the limitation’s impact is substantial or trivial.263 
This is not just a question that goes merely to the debate over the 
standard for finding an impairment substantial.  That debate has in 
itself largely been resolved in favor of requiring demanding 
standards.  Here, courts are asserting an evidentiary standard that 
                                                          
her impairment, such evidence could be based on the plaintiff’s own job search 
experience and need not come from vocational experts). 
 261. See EEOC v. Valu Merchs., Co., No. 01-2224, 2002 WL 1932533, at *6 (D. Kan. 
Aug. 9, 2002) (applying the Toyota daily tasks analysis, the court found that the 
plaintiff created an issue of fact where she presented evidence of “specific limitations 
on her day-to-day activities,” which included such things as cooking, cleaning, 
shopping for groceries, driving, child care, dressing herself, and personal hygiene). 
 262. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 641 (1998) (reasoning that “[w]hen 
significant limitations result from the impairment, the definition is met even if the 
difficulties are not insurmountable”).  In Bragdon, the Court accepted the plaintiff’s 
argument that an eight percent chance of transmitting HIV to a fetus during 
pregnancy could be a substantial limitation on a woman’s major life activity of 
reproduction.  Id. at 640. 
 263. Sitting is another activity that illustrates the real issue is not comparative 
evidence.  Office jobs require long hours of sitting.  Home life, however, may allow 
for more movement, more choice of resting position.  As a matter of common sense 
and life experience, a jury would know on average that a person should be able to sit 
in an office chair for an eight hour-a-day job without significant pain and difficulty.  
The jury needs evidence of how much pain and difficulty the plaintiff experiences, 
but in most cases, it does not need comparative evidence to tell it how that pain and 
difficulty compares to the average.  A jury can reasonably evaluate the claim without 
it, and without requiring that the plaintiff also prove the extent to which the sitting 
impairment affects the plaintiff’s home life. 
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stands in the plaintiff’s way—the requirement to provide certain types 
of evidence in order to prove limitation.  Because this is a question of 
evidence, it might offer plaintiffs an opportunity.  Plaintiffs may get 
past summary judgment if they present the comparative and daily task 
evidence that courts are saying they must present.  This raises, 
however, a new set of questions.  Is the kind of comparative evidence 
courts seem to be demanding available to plaintiffs?  Is it any more 
helpful than jury common sense and life experience?  The next Part 
addresses these questions. 
III. THE INADEQUACY OF CURRENT MEDICAL AND VOCATIONAL 
ASSESSMENTS TO MEET COURTS’ DEMANDS FOR COMPARATIVE 
EVIDENCE 
Courts have suggested that evidence of the plaintiff’s restrictions 
“without more” is insufficient to establish a substantial limitation of a 
major life activity.264  What evidence would this “more” be?  At least 
one pair of commentators has suggested that all a plaintiff needs to 
do is use her medical (or vocational) expert to opine on how the 
plaintiff’s condition compares to the average person’s to create an 
issue of fact to survive summary judgment.265  Is it that simple?266  This 
Part considers the assessments medical and vocational experts 
actually make and what they say about “average.” 
Medical and vocational experts may be able to provide the kind of 
comparison to “average” that courts suggest is lacking in some cases.  
In others, the type of medical or vocational data that courts seem to 
be insisting upon might not be available.  The potential for Daubert 
challenges to the evidence is therefore significant.  Ultimately the 
                                                          
 264. See Prickett v. Amoco Oil Co., 147 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1153 (D. Utah 2001) 
(following the Tenth Circuit’s requirement of “comparative evidence as to the 
general population’s lifting capabilities”); see also Olds v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 
127 F. App’x 779, 782 (6th Cir. 2005) (concluding that “a weight restriction alone” is 
not sufficient to establish substantial limitation). 
 265. See Van Detta & Gallipeau, supra note 15, at 522.  Van Detta and Gallipeau 
cite in support of their theory a federal district court opinion in which the plaintiff 
submitted an affidavit from her physician stating that “90% of the general population 
of similar sex and age would have better ability to stand and lift than [plaintiff].”  Id. 
(quoting Wheaton v. Ogden Newspapers, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1062 (N.D. Iowa 
1999) (alteration in original). 
 266. In some cases, the “more” to which courts refer has been interpreted to mean 
evidence of other impairments besides the ability to lift.  See Napreljac v. Monarch 
Mfg. Co., No. 4-02-CV-10075, 2003 WL 21976024, at *4 (S.D. Iowa May 27, 2003) 
(suggesting that a lifting restriction alone was not sufficient, but was evidence of 
disability when combined with restrictions against “repetitive pushing, repetitive 
pulling, repetitive working above shoulder level and reaching above her head, 
and . . . use [of] vibratory machinery”). 
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expert evidence that is produced may not be better at gauging 
substantial limitation than the fact finder’s common sense. 
A. Medical Evaluation and Comparative Evidence 
There are some well-known medical standards that incorporate 
what might be called an “average” norm (or at least, a range of 
normal from which to draw comparisons).  Twenty/twenty vision, 
normal blood pressure, and normal cholesterol levels are three that 
come quickly to mind.  As the Supreme Court’s ADA decisions make 
clear, however, deviation from these norms alone does not prove 
disability.267  Rather, the standards are at most a helpful starting point.  
For some functions, such as the basic motor skills discussed in this 
Article, there appear to be no general population norms.  There is no 
“average lifting capacity,” “average walking capacity,” or “average 
sitting capacity.”  Relevant medical evaluation of these functions 
tends to be oriented to the task at hand, which most commonly is 
returning a patient to a pre-existing level of functionality. 
Medical evaluation is first and foremost about the medical needs of 
the patient.  However, a good part of medical practice involves 
evaluating the patient’s ability to work.  In fact, both medical and 
vocational evaluations are heavily oriented toward assessing capacity 
to work, whether in the pre-hire or return-to-work contexts.268  For 
example, a common evaluation process used in occupational and 
rehabilitation medicine is the functional capacity evaluation (“FCE”).  
As described by the American Occupational Therapy Association, an 
FCE 
                                                          
 267. See, e.g., Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 564–65 (1999) 
(rejecting the lower court finding that the plaintiff with monocular vision was 
substantially limited for purposes of the ADA merely because the manner in which 
he sees is different); see also Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 521 
(1999) (finding a plaintiff’s high blood pressure was not a disability because 
medication controlled it). 
 268. See generally AM. MED. ASS’N, A PHYSICIAN’S GUIDE TO RETURN TO WORK (James 
B. Talmage & J. Mark Melhorn eds., 2005) (defining capacity as embodying strength, 
flexibility, and endurance and stating physicians most often deal with a subject’s 
current ability); MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES IN VOCATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF 
IMPAIRED WORKERS (Steven J. Scheer ed., 1990) (outlining vocational evaluations and 
issues relating to subjects with learning disabilities, visual impairments, and hearing 
impairments).  Even when discussing the physician’s role in an ADA case, the 
medical literature emphasizes return to work concerns.  See AM. MED. ASS’N, 
DISABILITY EVALUATION 70–71 (Stephen L. Demeter & Gunnar B.J. Andersson eds., 
2d ed. 2003) (1996) [hereinafter DISABILITY EVALUATION] (stating a physician must 
provide substantial detail and quantification of a worker’s restrictions and later 
confirm the manager’s interpretation of what indicated duties the worker cannot 
safely perform). 
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is an all-encompassing term to describe the physical assessment of 
an individual's ability to perform work-related activity. . . . A well-
designed FCE should be comprehensive in terms of encompassing 
the physical demands of work as defined by the U.S. Department of 
Labor in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT.), have 
standardized instructions and operational definitions, be practical 
regarding space and length of time for administration, be objective 
in minimizing examiner bias, and, most importantly, be reliable 
and valid. . . .269 
In simplified terms, a typical FCE assesses the patient’s ability to 
carry out various standardized physical tasks using measured weights 
and distances, measures range of motion and peak force, and may 
put the patient through a simulation of job tasks.270  FCEs are 
particularly common in cases involving musculoskeletal system 
disorders.271  There are several different systems for conducting FCEs 
sold by various commercial vendors.272  FCE systems often include 
both performance-based and self-report measures, but a “high value” 
is placed on observation of the patient’s physical abilities by a trained 
observer.273  The patient is asked to exert maximum force, and the 
resulting performance capacities are plotted onto a scale that mirrors 
the DOT classifications for frequency of activity (never, occasionally, 
frequently, and continuously).274  The ability to use hands and 
extremities, and the length of time activities such as sitting and 
standing can be performed, may also be part of the assessment.275 
                                                          
 269. The Am. Occupational Therapy Ass’n, Inc., Functional Capacity Evaluation 
Fact Sheet, http://www.aota.org/Consumers/WhatisOT/FactSheets/Conditions/35 
117.aspx (last visited Nov. 1, 2007) (citations omitted).   
 270. Glenn S. Pransky & Patrick G. Dempsey, Practical Aspects of Functional Capacity 
Evaluations, 14 J. OCCUPATIONAL REHAB. 217, 218 (2004). 
 271. Vincent Gouttebarge et al., Reliability and Validity of Functional Capacity 
Evaluation Methods:  A Systematic Review with Reference to Blankenship System, Ergos Work 
Simulator, Ergo-Kit, and Isernhagen Work System, 77 INT’L ARCHIVES OCCUPATIONAL & 
ENVTL. HEALTH 527, 528 (2004). 
 272. See id. at 271.  Among those mentioned in the Goutteberg et al. study are the 
Blackenship System, Ergo-Kit, the Ergos Work Simulator, and the Isernhagen Work 
System.  Id. 
 273. Douglas P. Gross & Michele C. Battié, Factors Influencing Results of Functional 
Capacity Evaluations in Workers’ Compensation Claimants with Low Back Pain, 85 PHYSICAL 
THERAPY 315, 316 (2005). 
 274. See Pransky & Dempsey, supra note 270, at 218, 220.  Occasionally means 
between one and thirty-three percent of the time, frequently means between thirty-
four and sixty-six percent of the time, and continuously means between sixty-seven 
and one hundred percent of the time.  Id. at 220.  These categories track the Physical 
Demand Strength Ratings used in the DOT, discussed in more detail earlier in this 
Article.  Supra notes 173–182 and accompanying text. 
 275. The Department of Labor has posted online the Work Capacity Evaluation 
form it requires for Musculoskeletal Conditions, which evaluates these tasks.  See U.S. 
DEP’T OF LABOR, WORK CAPACITY EVALUATION MUSCULOSKELETAL CONDITIONS 1–2 
(2001), http://www.dol.gov/esa/regs/compliance/owcp/OWCP-5c.pdf. 
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Despite the claim that FCEs lead to “objective information” about 
an individual’s functional abilities, the reliability of the various 
systems used to measure functional capacity have been the subject of 
debate in the professional literature.276  The methodology each FCE 
system uses to determine impairment has not been adequately 
studied.277  Because the data obtained in the testing depends for its 
validity on the effort of the person being tested, which in turn 
requires a judgment by the tester as to the sincerity of that effort, the 
ability to produce accurate results has been questioned.278  Even the 
most heavily used FCE systems have serious issues with their 
predictive ability.279 
The same is largely true of another prominent evaluation system, 
the AMA Guides.  Under the AMA Guides, physicians determine 
“whole person” impairment ratings (“WPIR”) of the kind frequently 
used in workers’ compensation systems.280  The AMA Guides 
(1) outline diagnostic criteria and procedures for various bodily 
systems and structures, such as the cardiovascular system, the ear, 
nose and throat, and the spine, among others; (2) suggest ranges of 
impairment percentages based on the clinical findings; and 
(3) provide example cases that fall within each of those ranges.281  A 
“whole person impairment percentage” is defined as an “estimate 
[of] the impact of the impairment on the individual’s ability to 
perform the activities of daily living, excluding work.”282  The AMA 
                                                          
 276. See Gouttebarge et al., supra note 271, at 528 (arguing that the providers of 
FCEs “do not supply enough evident information about the reliability and validity of 
these FCEs”); Pransky & Dempsey, supra note 270, at 226 (commenting that the 
acceptability of FCE use depends upon the application, such as whether for 
adjudication or preplacement evaluation); see also Phyllis M. King et al., A Critical 
Review of Functional Capacity Evaluations, 78 PHYSICAL THERAPY 852, 858 (1998) (“If an 
FCE measurement does not have established reliability, test results could be different 
with each administration.”). 
 277. Of the four systems mentioned in the Gouttebarge article, only one, the 
Isernhagen Work System, had been studied for reliability and validity.  See 
Gouttebarge et al., supra note 271, at 535 (stating that all authors of studies on the 
validity of this particular system mentioned the level of reliability); see also King et al, 
supra note 276, at 858 (listing only two FCE systems as examined for reliability:  (1) 
when administered by different evaluators and (2) when administered upon the 
same subject). 
 278. See Pransky & Dempsey, supra note 270, at 223–24 (emphasizing the 
challenge in determining what a subject cannot do rather than what the subject will 
not do). 
 279. See Gouttebarge et al., supra note 271, at 535–36; see also Pransky & Dempsey, 
supra note 270, at 224 (observing that while accuracy of the return to work prediction 
from an FCE “may be acceptable for a group of persons, the level of accuracy for an 
individual may be low and unacceptable”). 
 280. AMA GUIDES, supra note 25, at 4–5. 
 281. See generally id. 
 282. Id. at 4. 
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Guides list the activities of daily living (“ADL”) commonly measured 
along with examples: 
 
Activities of Daily Living Commonly Measured in Activities of 
Daily Living (“ADL”) and Instrumental Activities of Daily Living 
(“IADL”) Scales283 
Activity Example 
Self-care, 
personal hygiene 
Urinating, defecating, brushing 
teeth, combing hair, bathing, 
dressing oneself, eating 
Communication Writing, typing, seeing, hearing, 
speaking 
Physical  activity Standing, sitting, reclining, 
walking, climbing stairs 
Sensory function Hearing, seeing, tactile feeling, 
tasting, smelling 
Nonspecialized 
hand activities 
Grasping, lifting, tactile 
discrimination 
Travel Riding, driving, flying 
Sexual function Orgasm, ejaculation, 
lubrication, erection 
Sleep Restful, nocturnal sleep pattern 
 
The AMA Guides represent the AMA’s attempt to provide consistent 
and reproducible evaluation outcomes for all types of medical 
impairments.284  Just as with the FCEs, however, because each part of 
the impairment assessment comes down to the clinical judgment of 
the physician doing the evaluation, the meaningfulness of these 
impairment ratings has been questioned.285 
Whichever system is at issue, there are serious issues about how well 
the information obtained relates to the ADA question of substantial 
limitation, at least in cases not involving the major life activity of 
working.  On the positive side, like the ADA,286 the AMA Guides 
                                                          
 283. Id. tbl. 1-2. 
 284. Id. at 17 (theorizing that two physicians following the AMA Guides should 
reach similar results and conclusions). 
 285. See James P. Robinson et al., Pain, Impairment, and Disability in the AMA 
Guides, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 315, 315 (2004); Charles Richard O’Keefe, Jr., Note, 
The AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment and Workers’ 
Compensation in Indiana, 27 IND. L. REV. 647, 679–81 (1994) (noting a critic arguing 
that it would be an error to characterize the AMA Guides as objective and 
highlighting normative decisions of physicians as to both organ–level and whole 
person impairment). 
 286. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(2) (2000). 
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explicitly distinguish between impairment and disability, noting that 
“[t]he impairment evaluation, however, is only one aspect of 
disability determination.”287  Also like the ADA, the AMA Guides 
define impairment physiologically or mentally, not functionally.288  
The AMA Guides also indicate that work-related impairment (as in the 
ability to work itself) is not to be considered when determining a 
person’s overall impairment.289 
Also, both the AMA Guides and typical FCE systems suggest that the 
patient’s ADL are to be considered as part of the evaluation 
process.290  This would seem at first glance to overlap with Toyota’s 
daily activities standard.291  None of the evaluation systems is 
designed, however, to measure daily activities as compared to 
average.  To be sure, the AMA Guides reference “normal” as a 
touchstone for rating impairment, but the description of what is 
meant by this reveals it is not the comparison courts seem to be 
seeking in ADA cases: 
Loss, loss of use, or derangement implies a change from a normal 
or “preexisting” state.  Normal is a range or zone representing 
healthy functioning and varies with age, gender, and other factors 
such as environmental conditions.  For example, a normal heart 
rate varies between a child and an adult and according to whether 
a person is resting or exercising.  Multiple factors need to be 
considered when assessing whether a specific or overall function is 
                                                          
 287. AMA GUIDES, supra note 25, at 8.  The definition of disability in the AMA 
Guides is not, however, the same as under the ADA.  The AMA Guides defines 
disability as “an alteration of an individual’s capacity to meet personal, social, or 
occupational demands or statutory or regulatory requirements because of an 
impairment.”  Id. 
 288. Compare 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (2007) (defining physical impairment to 
include “[a]ny physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or 
anatomical loss affecting one or more . . . body systems” and mental impairment as 
“[a]ny mental or psychological disorder”), with AMA GUIDES, supra note 25, at 2 
(defining “impairment” as “a loss, loss of use, or derangement of any body part, 
organ system, or organ function”). 
 289. AMA GUIDES, supra note 25, at 4.  The AMA Guides provide that they are “not 
intended to be used for direct estimates of work disability [and i]mpairment 
percentages derived according to the Guides criteria do not measure work disability.”  
Id. at 9.  At the same time, however, the AMA Guides recognize that physicians in 
appropriate cases may express opinions about disability.  See id. at 14 (noting a 
physician’s input is often essential for determining substantial limitation of a major 
life activity or record of impairment under the ADA). 
 290. See id. at 4 tbl. I-2; King et al., supra note 276, at 859 (noting that as part of 
the data gathering process for an FCE, the evaluator interviews the patient about 
such things as “exercise programs, home and recreational activities, and level of 
functioning in activities of daily living . . . to establish a baseline on the client and 
reduce the risk of reinjury”). 
 291. See supra notes 199–202 and accompanying text (establishing a plaintiff under 
the ADA must prove substantial impairment in all activities central for daily living). 
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normal.  A normal value can be defined from an individual or a 
population perspective.292 
“Normal” under the AMA Guides can therefore be based on the 
individual—what is normal for that particular person.293  ADA cases 
do not accept an individual-based norm.294 
The AMA Guide’s definition of “normal” also suggests that some 
population-based norms could include age, gender and other 
factors.295  By contrast, the ADA speaks only of “the average person in 
the general population.”296  The Interpretive Guidance explicitly notes 
that “advanced age [and] physical or personality characteristics” are 
not impairments.297  The regulations nowhere suggest that “average” 
can be based on some sliding demographic scale (even if, arguably, 
that would make sense). 
Further, the term “activities of daily living” is somewhat misleading 
if looked at from an ADA perspective.  In the FCE/return-to-work 
assessment, the patient’s ability is tested in a clinical sense—i.e., the 
patient is put through a series of tasks designed to measure the 
patient’s lifting, walking, bending, and similar categories of ADLs.298  
The patient may be asked questions about other activities, but, as a 
rehabilitation physician interviewed for this Article noted, the types 
of home life activities that courts suggest ADA plaintiffs must address, 
like difficulty carrying groceries, lifting laundry baskets, and cleaning 
house, are not considered a typical part of the evaluation process.299  
Explicit evaluation of limits in those activities comes into play only 
when there is a suspicion that the patient is “slipping into chronic 
pain behaviors.”300 
                                                          
 292. AMA GUIDES, supra note 25, at 2. 
 293. See id. (articulating a normal value may be from an individual’s perspective). 
 294. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1) (2007) (defining a substantial limitation in 
comparison to the average person within the general population). 
 295. AMA GUIDES, supra note 25, at 4; see DISABILITY EVALUATION, supra note 268, at 
91 (noting that epidemiology is a population science but that legal adjudications 
require individualized decisions). 
 296. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1); see Arnold v. Cook County Adult Prob. Dep’t, 13 
A.D. Cases 244, 247 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (questioning relevance of a doctor’s report that 
compared the plaintiff’s physical ability to push and pull to that of a man of similar 
age). 
 297. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j). 
 298. See, e.g., King et al., supra note 276, at 860 (describing the types of functional 
force assessments that are typically used to measure lifting capacity). 
 299. Interview with Terrance Glennon, M.D., Assistant Professor, Northwestern 
University, Feinberg School of Medicine, Department of Physical Medicine and 
Rehabilitation, in Carbondale, Ill. (July 26, 2006).   
 300. Id. Chronic pain syndrome is not well defined in the medical literature, but 
involves some type of pain that has not resolved itself after a period of time, which 
may be a set period (three or six months) or a more condition specific time (“the 
reasonable expected healing time for the involved tissues”).  See Manish K. Singh et 
al., Chronic Pain Syndrome, http://www.emedicine.com/pmr/topic32.htm (last visited 
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When an evaluation is being made for return-to-work purposes, 
that evaluation focuses on the demands of the particular job and the 
individual’s ability to meet those demands without the likelihood of 
re-injury.301  This in effect narrows the horizons of the assessment.  
Courts may have some basis for being reluctant to accept physician-
imposed activity restrictions, such as the lifting-weight restrictions, 
because those restrictions might reflect a conservative treatment 
regime more than the extent of actual limitation.  The physician in 
turn may be unwilling to commit to a more specific assessment of the 
level of impairment, because medicine is still not doing a good job 
(in the mind of doctors) with the science of impairment.302 
In obvious cases, where the impairment is so medically substantial 
that there is little doubt that it also meets the ADA’s definition of 
substantial (such as one case where the physician stated that “90% of 
individuals of similar sex and age” have more lifting and walking 
ability than the plaintiff),303 the physician might be willing to state a 
specific opinion.  Even acknowledging the physician’s expertise, 
however, this type of opinion does not add much when the fact finder 
can probably draw a similar conclusion about the severity of the 
impairment from common sense. 
There have been some cases where plaintiffs have included WPIRs 
and FCEs in evidence presented to prove their ADA disability.304  
Perhaps there are indeed cases where the impairment ratings are 
helpful to determine substantiality of limitation, such as cases where 
the impairment and the major life activity are less commonly 
understood.  Several circuits have, for example, recognized 
                                                          
Sept. 29, 2007).  Part of treating chronic pain syndrome is interrupting the 
reinforcement of pain behavior and modulation of the pain response.  Id.  Doctor 
Glennon suggested that examining patients about specific daily activities like 
carrying laundry baskets could in effect reinforce the patient engaging in chronic 
pain behaviors.  Interview with Terrance Glennon, supra note 299. 
 301. See, e.g., King et al., supra note 276, at 857 (describing a well-designed FCE). 
 302. Interview with Terrance Glennon, supra note 299; see DISABILITY EVALUATION, 
supra note 268, at xiii-xiv (noting “the almost total lack of scientific research” 
regarding impairment medicine). 
 303. See Wheaton v. Ogden Newspapers, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1063 (N.D. 
Iowa 1999) (finding the plaintiff submitted sufficient evidence to withstand summary 
judgment on the issue of substantial limitation with evidence her doctor imposed a 
flat ten-pound lifting limitation and submitted an affidavit “opin[ing] that 90% of 
the general population of similar sex and age” can stand and lift more than the 
plaintiff could). 
 304. See, e.g., Webner v. Titan Distrib., Inc., 267 F.3d 828, 834 (8th Cir. 2001) 
(noting that a doctor testified that the plaintiff had an eighteen-percent whole 
person impairment rating as a result of his three back surgeries); Pryor v. Trane Co., 
138 F.3d 1024, 1026-27 (5th Cir. 1998) (relating that a plaintiff’s physical therapist 
testified regarding the results of her functional capacity evaluations). 
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“elimination of bodily waste” as a major life activity.305  In that context, 
a doctor’s finding of a seventy-percent impairment of the whole 
person because of a less common impairment such as “bilateral 
polycystic renal disease”306 might help the jury assess the degree of the 
plaintiff’s limitation.  A seventy-percent impairment rating, however, 
would probably strike a court as one of the “plain on its face” types of 
cases.307  It is doubtful that the medical profession wants to become 
involved in debates about the significance of lesser percentages 
(Forty percent?  Thirty percent?), especially if asked to compare them 
to “the average person in the general population,” in light of the 
reservations medical science has regarding impairment medicine.308 
Accordingly, medicine might be able to measure average capacity 
versus diminished capacity in such things as eyesight, heart function, 
and so forth, but it is still rather poor in being able to measure how 
impairment translates into actual disability.  Moreover, the medical 
focus is on treatment of the individual to gain as much function as 
that individual is capable of gaining, not on comparison of that 
individual to some type of average norm.  To a physician, the average 
person’s lifting or standing ability is a rather meaningless concept.  
Perhaps this is one reason why there does not appear to have been 
significant study of it. 
B. Vocational Evaluation and Comparative Evidence 
Many of the same issues arise regarding vocational evaluations as 
they relate to major life activities other than working.309  Vocational 
evaluations 
                                                          
 305. Heiko v. Colombo Sav. Bank, 434 F.3d 249, 251 (4th Cir. 2006); see Fiscus v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 385 F.3d 378, 384 (3d Cir. 2004); Kammueller v. Loomis, Fargo 
& Co., 383 F.3d 779, 785 (8th Cir. 2004); see also Gilbert v. Frank, 949 F.2d 637, 641 
(2d Cir. 1991) (suggesting a willingness to find persons who cannot eliminate bodily 
wastes without aid of dialysis to have substantial limitation in their ability to care for 
themselves). 
 306. AMA GUIDES, supra note 25, at 149. 
 307. See Wheaton, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 1063 (denying a motion for summary judgment 
in part because of expert testimony stating that the plaintiff’s impairment restricted 
him more than “90% of the general population”). 
 308. See DISABILITY EVALUATION, supra note 268, at xiii-xiv (noting the reservations 
about impairment medicine and the need for further research in this area). 
 309. Among other things, in working disability cases, vocational experts can 
provide labor market data that addresses the factors outlined in the regulations for 
determining the substantiality of the limitation on working.  See Carl Gann, Vocational 
Experts in Employment Law Cases, 11 J. LEGAL ECON. 53, 59–60 (2002) (describing 
vocational experts’ role in performing labor market surveys); see also 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1630.2(j)(3)(ii) (2007) (setting out demographic factors that may be considered 
regarding substantial limitation of working). 
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determin[e] the occupations a person can perform based upon an 
analysis of foundational factors that are integrated into a 
meaningful conclusion about employment potential.  This factor 
integration includes the person’s age, education, work experience 
and training, marketable transferable skills, aptitudes, work 
personality, physical and mental capacities, and access to the labor 
market.310 
Vocational evaluation, by necessity, looks at how a person’s physical 
condition affects her ability to work.  The vocational evaluator (which 
in ADA cases may be a rehabilitation counselor)311 is charged with 
determining what job positions the individual can fill, with an eye 
toward assisting the individual in finding appropriate employment.312  
The evaluator gives the individual a battery of tests, some pen and 
paper, some requiring physical skills like manual dexterity.313  The 
evaluator also obtains other data from the individual, which can 
include medical information.314  A report is then generated that gives 
the individual undergoing evaluation information about appropriate 
job titles or occupations, generally based on either the DOT,315 or 
more recently, O*NET,316 both developed by the U.S. Department of 
Labor.317 
The DOT uses more than eighty variables to evaluate over 12,000 
types of jobs, with many of the variables focusing on physical and 
functional skills and abilities.318  As noted above, each occupation is 
                                                          
 310. Gann, supra note 309, at 54 (citation omitted). 
 311. Gann suggests that “[t]he rehabilitation counselor is a unique choice as a 
vocational expert in disability discrimination cases” because that counselor “is a 
blend of the bodies of knowledge of occupational information and disability 
information brought together by the profession of counseling.”  Id. at 55. 
 312. See id. at 54–55 (noting the vocational expert’s use of a “vocational 
evaluation” to determine employability of an individual and “feasible vocational 
goals”). 
 313. Interview with Jack Musgrave, supra note 182. 
 314. Id. 
 315. DOT, supra note 23. 
 316. O*NET, supra note 24. 
 317. These reports have not been mandated by courts, even in working cases, 
although they may be considered helpful.  See Duncan v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit 
Auth., 240 F.3d 1110, 1115–17 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (reasoning that evidence of the 
number and type of jobs from which the plaintiff is excluded because of his 
impairment can be based on the plaintiff’s own job search experience and need not 
come from vocational experts); see also Mullins v. Crowell, 228 F.3d 1305, 1314–15 
n.18 (11th Cir. 2000) (concluding that “expert vocational evidence, although 
instructive, is not necessary” to prove substantial limitation in working). 
 318. See Jack Reeves, O*NET versus DOT—You Have to Admit This is Getting 
Interesting, http://www.theworksuite.com/id13.html (last visited May 18, 2007) 
(noting the number of variables and types of jobs listed in the DOT).  The DOT is 
detailed and complex, and a full explanation of it is beyond the scope of this Article.  
The introduction to the DOT contains an overview that explains what comprises each 
title.  DOT, supra note 23, at xv-xxii.  In addition, Appendix C to the DOT sets out the 
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given a physical demands strength rating that categorizes the work 
into sedentary, light, medium, heavy, and very heavy based on the 
required exertion (“[e]xerting up to 20 pounds of force 
occasionally,” “10 pounds of force constantly,” etc.).319  By contrast, 
O*NET focuses more on cognitive-oriented work skills.320  The job 
reports simply rank various variables on a 0–100 scale for each job 
category.321 
Neither the DOT nor O*NET is particularly helpful under the 
Toyota daily activities approach.  To say a person is excluded from a 
particular number of job titles says essentially nothing about how that 
person’s impairment affects her ability to function outside the 
workplace.322  Exclusion from job titles may have some relevance to 
the question of whether someone is substantially limited in the major 
life activity of working,323 but is unlikely to be the “more” courts have 
been demanding in some other major life activity cases.324 
                                                          
various physical strength variables that are part of the occupational definitions.  Id. at 
1009–14. 
In addition to issues regarding substantial impairment, the DOT has been used in 
ADA litigation on the issue of the essential functions of a job.  See Deane v. Pocono 
Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 147 (3d Cir. 1998) (discussing the plaintiff’s vocational 
expert’s reliance on the DOT job description for “general duty nurse” to argue that 
the plaintiff was qualified for the position despite her lifting restrictions because 
lifting was not an essential function of that job). 
 319. See DOT, supra note 23, at 1013. 
 320. Reeves, supra note 318. 
 321. O*Net job reports demonstrating the way the system rates variables can be 
generated on-line.  See, e.g., O*Net Online, Details Report for 51-4121.06 Welders, 
Cutters, and Welder Fitters, http://online.onetcenter.org/link/details/51-4121.06 
(last visited Nov. 2, 2007).  O*net’s predecessor, the DOT, was last updated in 1991 
and has therefore been criticized for being considerably out of date.  Robert E. 
Rains, Debating Disability Design:  A Response, FED. LAW., May 2000, at 43.  O*NET was 
supposed to replace the DOT, as the labor market moves away from manual labor to 
more cognitive-based labor, but has been deemed disappointing by those who use it 
because what it produces is too general to be of much real use.  Interview with Jack 
Musgrave, supra note 182.  O*NET has apparently proven disappointing to 
vocational evaluators because it does not assess transferable job skills as well as the 
DOT.  Id.  One commentator specifically noted how unhelpful O*NET is for 
evaluators doing ADA work.  Reeves, supra note 318.  In addition, much of 
contemporary service work retains a manual labor component, including work in the 
retail, food service, and health care sectors.  See, e.g., Galenbeck v. Newman & 
Newman, Inc., No. 02-6278, 2004 WL 1088289, at *2 (D. Ore. May 14, 2004) 
(describing the plaintiff, who worked at carry-out pizza store and had to lift twenty-
five pound sacks of flour). 
 322. Expert reports that simply gather computer-generated information based on 
DOT job titles stand less of a chance of being admissible in general.  See Zarzycki v. 
United Tech. Corp., 30 F. Supp. 2d 283, 291–92 (D. Conn. 1998) (rejecting an 
expert’s report in a working disability case because his analysis was based solely on 
the job titles he identified as matching the plaintiff’s skills and abilities and did not 
say anything about the actual number of jobs within each of those titles). 
 323. An evaluator would be able to track transferable skills using the DOT, and 
also address the degree of exclusion for a person of similar training, skills, and 
abilities.  Software such as OASYS generates reports that supply some local 
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Courts may in fact be demonstrating a lack of understanding of the 
labor market.  Some courts have suggested that “heavy lifting” is 
beyond average capacity.325  This leads to their refusal to find 
substantial limitation when plaintiffs present evidence that their 
impairment excludes them from the very heavy, heavy, or even 
medium heavy job categories.326  However, labor categories are to a 
large extent associated with education—such individuals with only a 
limited education may in fact be substantially limited if they are 
excluded from all but the sedentary and light job categories.327 
In the bigger picture, what this suggests is that courts and 
medical/vocational professionals are speaking different languages 
when they consider the ability to perform the tasks of daily living.  
This is not to say that a physician or vocational specialist would not be 
able to speak to some sense of average capacity.  More, the question is 
                                                          
demographic info based on estimates using data gathered under the Workforce 
Investment Act.  Interview with Jack Musgrave, supra note 182; see Zarzycki, 30 F. 
Supp. at 291 (describing expert’s process of using OASYS computer system to 
generate his report). 
 324. Indeed, DOT exclusion has been treated as probative in some cases and 
dismissed as non-probative in others.  Compare Mondzelewski v. Pathmark Stores, 
Inc., 162 F.3d 778, 785–86 (3d Cir. 1998) (finding expert’s report, which used the 
DOT to estimate the types of jobs the plaintiff could do with his impairment, was 
sufficient to meet the evidentiary burden for substantial limitation), with Zarzycki, 30 
F. Supp. 2d at 292 (criticizing expert’s report for failing to consider the actual 
number of jobs, only DOT titles that matched plaintiff’s abilities), and EEOC v. 
Rockwell Int’l Corp., 60 F. Supp. 2d 791, 797-98 (N.D. Ill. 1999), aff’d, 243 F.3d 1012 
(7th Cir. 2001) (drawing a parallel to Zarzycki to find vocational counselor’s expert 
report inadmissible because it contained no evidence on the number of jobs in the 
local market from which the claimants were excluded, instead analyzing job titles in 
the DOT only).  Rockwell International raises the further issue of whether an expert’s 
report must meet the requirements for admissibility under Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).  The court in Rockwell International held 
both that the expert’s methodology was not scientifically reliable and that his 
conclusions were not helpful to the trier of fact because of their generality.  60 F. 
Supp. 2d at 797–98; see infra Part IV.C. 
 325. Buettner v. N. Okla. County Mental Health Ctr., 158 F. App’x 81, 87 (10th 
Cir. 2005) (suggesting that restrictions on heavy lifting are “part of the human 
condition”); Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance Serv., Inc., 283 F.3d 11, 22 (1st Cir. 2002) 
(suggesting that “a capacity to perform heavy lifting is not a trait shared by the 
majority of the population”). 
 326. The DOT defines “medium work” as “[e]xerting 20 to 50 pounds of force 
occasionally, and/or 10 to 25 pounds of force frequently, and/or greater than 
negligible up to 10 pounds of force constantly to move objects.”  DOT, supra note 23, 
at 1013.  The cases finding twenty-pound lifting restrictions insufficient as a matter of 
law are, in effect, concluding that an exclusion from even medium work is not a 
substantial limitation. 
 327. Interview with Jack Musgrave, supra note 182.  As the rejected expert report 
in Zarzycki pointed out, only 1965 out of 12,741 occupations listed in the DOT are 
light or sedentary work.  30 F. Supp. 2d at 291; see TERRY L. BLACKWELL ET AL., THE 
VOCATIONAL EXPERT UNDER SOCIAL SECURITY 16 (1992) (describing as “the most 
difficult claimants” for vocational evaluation individuals “who have sufficient 
impairment to restrict them to sedentary or light work, but who have no more than a 
grammar school education and a work history of lower level, semi-skilled jobs”). 
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whether insistence on expert testimony to establish comparison to 
average ability is disingenuous given that expert knowledge on that 
narrow topic may not be all that much more reliable than what 
common understanding and experience provides.  As the next Part 
discusses, it also raises questions about whether the evidence would 
meet reliability standards under the Federal Rules of Evidence. 
C. Potential Daubert Issues in the Medical and Vocational Evidence of 
“Average” 
One potential problem plaintiffs will have if they seek to introduce 
medical and vocational evidence of “average” is whether that 
evidence can pass a challenge under Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.328  Because courts are treating “average” as an 
issue of medical science, the comparative evidence must have 
sufficient scientific validity to be admissible under Daubert.329  It must 
also assist the trier of fact in understanding a fact in issue.330  Both of 
these requirements may prove to be difficult in some ADA claims, 
especially if there is no science of “average” in regard to the 
impairment at issue. 
To be considered reliable, the Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert 
requires scientific evidence to pass four general considerations: 
1) whether the expert’s analysis derives from a scientific method 
that can be or has been tested, 2) whether the expert’s 
methodology has been the subject of peer review and testing, 
3) the actual or potential rate of error in the expert’s methodology, 
and 4) whether the relevant scientific community generally accepts 
the expert’s methodology.331 
                                                          
 328. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 329. Id. at 592-93; see EEOC v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 243 F.3d 1012, 1015–18 (7th 
Cir. 2001) (discussing and affirming the judgment of the district court after it 
rejected an ADA vocational expert’s report under Daubert standards).  A plaintiff 
might argue that an expert’s opinion need not be based on scientific methodology, 
but rather comes from “specialized knowledge,” which can be based on experience 
in the field.  See Humphreys v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., No. C 04-03808, 2006 WL 
1867713, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 6, 2006) (allowing an expert to testify in a 
discrimination case as to the defendant’s human resources practices based on his 
long experience as a professor of organizational studies and working in the staffing 
and employment industry).  The nature of the evidence courts seem to be 
demanding in the substantial limitation cases, however, most likely does not fall 
under the “specialized knowledge” rubric.  The issue is one of medical science and 
will probably require plaintiffs to demonstrate scientific reliability under the general 
Daubert standard. 
 330. FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 331. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94. 
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These considerations are not exhaustive, and trial judges have 
considerable leeway to determine whether the evidence is reliable.332 
A methodology does not have to be well established to survive a 
Daubert challenge.333  For example, the Sixth Circuit upheld a district 
court’s decision to allow an academic psychologist’s testimony about 
how the plaintiff’s reading and comprehension skills compared to 
“average,” despite acknowledging that the expert’s opinion was based 
on a theoretical model that had not been empirically analyzed for 
purposes of diagnosis and treatment of reading disorders.334  The 
expert had reviewed the results of a number of assessment tests the 
plaintiff completed for a clinical psychologist and neuropsychologist 
(which were not themselves challenged) and concluded that the data 
revealed that the plaintiff performed within a normal range.335  The 
court rejected criticism of the expert’s opinion, reasoning that she 
was not second-guessing the clinical diagnosis offered by the other 
experts but rather determining “whether [the plaintiff’s] test results 
were consistent with a substantial impairment in his reading 
ability.”336  The science of testing produced a range of “average,” to 
which the expert made a comparison. 
By contrast, however, another court rejected the testimony of a 
physician who used a percentile formula to compare a plaintiff’s ten-
pound lifting restriction to the overall population.337  The court in 
that case concluded that the physician’s report provided no basis for 
the percentile comparison:  “[The expert] offers no data, no source 
                                                          
 332. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999); see Daubert, 509 U.S. 
at 595 (emphasizing flexibility and including other applicable evidentiary rules in a 
judge’s analysis).  Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, amended after Daubert, 
applies to all expert testimony, not just scientific, but incorporates Daubert’s 
elements: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of 
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, 
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the 
testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the 
product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied 
the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. 
FED. R. EVID. 702; see Note, Reliable Evaluation of Expert Testimony, 116 HARV. L. REV. 
2142, 2144 (2003) (noting that Rule 702 incorporates the standards articulated by 
the Supreme Court). 
 333. See Kumho, 526 U.S. at 151 (noting that a claim by a scientific expert might 
not have been subject to peer review because the particular issue might not have 
raised scientific interest before the suit in question raised it). 
 334. Gonzales v. Nat’l Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 225 F.3d 620, 628 n.15 (6th Cir. 
2000). 
 335. Id. at 628. 
 336. Id. at 628 n.15. 
 337. Gallegos v. Swift & Co., 237 F.R.D. 633, 640 (D. Colo. 2006). 
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of information and no demographic evidence to back up his bald 
assertions.”338 
This latter case illustrates the dilemma plaintiffs may face.  They 
must meet courts’ expectations about comparative evidence but when 
they do offer expert evidence, it may end up being successfully 
challenged as unreliable because there is no scientific basis for a 
comparison to “average.” 
Another Daubert issue is the requirement that the information 
“assist the trier of fact.”339  The Court in Daubert suggested that this is 
primarily a question of relevance, in the sense of whether the 
testimony relates to an issue in the case.340  But it also relates to 
whether having an expert testify is superfluous because the matter is 
one within common knowledge.341  When courts in the ADA cases 
dismiss claims because no comparative evidence was presented, they 
are moving the question beyond what is helpful to what is required, 
either explicitly or as a matter of practical reality, to survive summary 
judgment.342 
Interpretation of specialized test results to determine whether 
someone’s cognitive processing is substantially different than average 
may in fact be a subject beyond common understanding.  An opinion 
on the substantiality of a lifting impairment compared to average 
ability is probably unnecessary.343  Moreover, it raises concerns about 
                                                          
 338. Id. 
 339. FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 340. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 341. Expert opinions that are within the layperson’s knowledge may be excluded. 
Whether the situation is a proper one for the use of expert testimony is to be 
determined on the basis of assisting the trier. “There is no more certain test 
for determining when experts may be used than the common sense inquiry 
whether the untrained layman would be qualified to determine intelligently 
and to the best possible degree the particular issue without enlightenment 
from those having a specialized understanding of the subject involved in the 
dispute.” 
FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note on 1972 proposed rules (quoting Mason 
Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REV. 414, 418 (1952)). 
 342. This in essence makes “average person in the general population” the legal 
equivalent of “unreasonably dangerous” in products liability defective design cases 
and the standard of care in medical malpractice cases, both of which routinely 
require expert testimony in order to get to a jury. 
 343. See Whitfield v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 2d 434, 439 (D. Del. 1999).  
In Whitfield, the court found the following rather underwhelming expert testimony 
sufficient to create an issue of fact for the jury on how the plaintiff’s abilities 
compared to those of an average person: 
Q:  In your experience as a nurse, is an unimpaired person limited in their 
ability to do repetitive reaching? 
A:  (Pause) I would have to say no. 
Q:  How about bending? 
A:  (Pause) Again, I would have to say no, but I would like to qualify it by 
saying that one may not necessarily be impaired, but they may be limited 
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the “cloak of authority” that comes from having an expert testify, 
when the expert’s opinion is no more weighty (or scientific) than 
common knowledge.344 
IV. WHAT ULTIMATELY IS COMMON-SENSE USE OF COMPARATIVE 
EVIDENCE? 
At this point, several different conclusions might be reached about 
the evidentiary standard for proving substantial limitation.  One is 
that courts are insisting on additional expert testimony that isn’t 
necessary for juries to be able to assess whether ADA’s legal standards 
are met.  Another is that plaintiffs’ attorneys need to pay more 
attention to developing the record of impact on the daily lives of 
their clients.  Yet another is that the medical and vocational 
rehabilitation fields could aid those who work with ADA claims by 
developing systems that establish scientific benchmarks of “average” 
abilities.  The best conclusion is probably some form of all three. 
Courts are demanding unnecessary additional evidence in some 
ADA contexts.  The lifting cases discussed in this Article illustrate the 
                                                          
because of poor muscle tone or, you know, something along those lines. 
So— 
Q:  Well, is a normal healthy adult generally able to repetitively bend? 
A:  I would have to say yes. 
Q:  Is a normal healthy adult able to lift more than 20 pounds? 
A:  (Pause) I would have to say yes, depending on the person’s stamina. 
Q:  Are normally healthy adults generally able to stand in one place for 
longer than half an hour? 
A:  (Pause) My professional opinion on that one is going to be no, not 
without requiring a position change just because of circulatory compromises. 
Q:  Well, are normal healthy adults able to stand in one place in the way that 
cashiers are required to stand in one place for longer than half an hour? 
A:  Yes. 
Id.; cf. EEOC v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 243 F.3d 1012, 1021 (7th Cir. 2001) (Wood, J., 
dissenting) (“I see nothing to be gained by having vocational experts routinely 
appear in ADA cases solely for the purpose of testifying that a broad range of jobs 
require the ability to lift 30 pounds, or the ability to perform repetitive motions.”). 
 344. The case in which the court emphasized the plaintiff’s doctor’s opinion that 
her lifting restriction was worse than “90% of the general population of similar sex 
and age” demonstrates the way courts themselves attach a cloak of authority to an 
expert opinion, even when that severe a restriction should be obvious enough that 
expert testimony becomes a waste of judicial resources.  See Wheaton v. Ogden 
Newspapers, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1063 (N.D. Iowa 1999).  The plaintiff in 
Wheaton also testified to her limitations, and compared her lifting abilities to that of 
average person.  See id. at 1062–63.  The court read Eighth Circuit precedent to 
require “‘more’ evidence than merely her lifting restriction to generate a genuine 
issue of material fact” regarding whether she was substantially limited, and the 
doctor’s affidavit convinced the court that she met that requirement.  Id.; cf. Richard 
B. Katskee, Why it Mattered to Dover that Intelligent Design Isn’t Science, 5 FIRST AMEND. L. 
REV. 112, 115 (2006) (noting the “the public’s scientific illiteracy (which leads most 
of us, unreflectively, to regard any view dressed in the lab coat of pseudoscientific 
terminology as wearing the cloak of scientific authority)”). 
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courts’ tendency to eschew individualized assessment in favor of per se 
rules, wrapped in the guise of plaintiffs’ failure to meet their 
evidentiary burden.345  Although they recognize that some 
impairments are limiting on their face, they also fail to credit 
evidence that is sufficient for the fact finder to judge whether the 
impairment presents a substantial enough limitation. 
The Supreme Court in Kirkingburg stated that the burden of 
proving substantial limitation was not onerous and should be proven 
by testimony about the plaintiff’s experience.346  What can be gleaned 
from this is that the Court believed the fact finder could judge the 
substantiality of a limitation from knowing how the impairment (in 
that case, lessened visual acuity) affected the plaintiff.  In other 
words, the Court saw substantiality as a fact question centered on the 
plaintiff and not on the science of “average.”  Most people hearing 
about another’s personal and medical experience with a physical or 
mental impairment would be able to judge how it relates to average 
human experience.347  Therefore, insisting on additional “scientific” 
evidence of average is unnecessary in many of these cases. 
Courts should also stop being dismissive of the evidence of impact 
on plaintiffs’ daily activities when offered to prove a limitation is 
substantial.  Whether an impairment is substantially limiting is not 
the same question as whether an activity qualifies as a major life 
activity.  Toyota spoke of each alleged manual task having to be 
central to daily living, individually or in the aggregate, because that is 
the nature of “performing manual tasks.”348  It is a class-based major 
                                                          
 345. When the “on its face” standard was first used by courts in evaluating 
substantiality questions, it probably meant only that identification of an impairment 
is not in itself proof of a disability.  In other words, “on its face” meant “alone.”  That 
is true, as far as it goes.  The individualized assessment model of the ADA does 
require determination of how an impairment impacts the particular plaintiff before 
the court.  See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 483 (1999).  As the cases 
discussed earlier in this Article demonstrate, however, “on its face” has shifted 
meaning at least for some courts to “as a matter of law.”  The individualized 
assessment has been replaced by a per se rule that lifting restrictions of twenty-five 
pounds or more are not substantially limiting.  See, e.g., Wheaton, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 
1062 (noting such a per se rule in the Eighth Circuit). 
 346. Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 567 (1999). 
 347. The Fourth Circuit rejected a claim by a woman asserting she was 
substantially limited in the major life activity of socializing with others by noting that 
her avoiding certain co-workers “[did] not distinguish her from the general 
population[,]” and that she failed to provide sufficient testimony about her own 
experience to create a question of fact as to the substantiality of her alleged 
limitations.  Rohan v. Networks Presentations, L.L.C., 375 F.3d 266, 275–76 (4th Cir. 
2004). 
 348. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002). 
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life activity; if the individual task is not significant, the sum of the 
tasks must be.349 
When discrete motor functions are at issue, the same analysis does 
not apply.  Impact evidence is offered in those cases not to prove 
each such daily activity is a major life activity in and of itself, but 
rather to meet Kirkingburg’s standard that the plaintiff must provide 
evidence of his or her personal experience.350  For a person with 
restrictions on basic motor functions like lifting, walking, standing, et 
cetera, difficulty doing activities such as lawn mowing, household 
chores, driving, sewing, et cetera, is evidence of substantial impact 
because these are all activities the average person without basic motor 
function impairments can perform with little or no restriction.  They 
are what most people can do, to put it in the language of the 
legislative history of the ADA.351  The plaintiff need not be fully 
restricted from these activities, just find them significantly more 
difficult to do.352 
That said, plaintiffs’ counsel can also do a better job, based on the 
reported cases, of developing the fact record.  ADA plaintiffs’ counsel 
would be wise to consider a suggestion made by Professor Michael 
Selmi for employment law cases in general:  “present evidence to 
explain the nature of the discrimination at issue, and in presenting 
the evidence . . . generally assume the court is hostile to the claim.”353  
Even if courts are too demanding of impact evidence, plaintiffs 
should anticipate that judicial hostility and, when possible, articulate 
with some degree of detail how the impairment affects daily activities.  
A ten or even twenty-pound lifting restriction, for example, should 
have some manifestation in a person’s home life.  It strains credibility 
when a plaintiff cannot articulate how an impairment of a basic 
motor function actually affects him and has to rely on the mere fact 
of physician imposed restrictions.  Plaintiffs need to overcome the 
apparent judicial belief that those limitations are mostly on paper. 
Relatedly, the medical and vocational rehabilitation fields should 
consider turning more attention to the dilemma ADA claimants face 
with having to establish a comparison to “average.”  Given that both 
                                                          
 349. Id. 
 350. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. at 567. 
 351. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990). 
 352. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) (2007) (defining “substantially limits” to 
include “[s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under 
which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the 
condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general 
population can perform that same major life activity”). 
 353. Selmi, supra note 196, at 573. 
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the medical and vocational rehabilitation professions responded to 
workers’ compensation and other disability compensation programs 
by developing impairment rating systems (e.g., FCEs, the AMA 
Guides), they should do the same for the issues raised by the ADA.  
Use of ADA-specific FCE systems to demonstrate the many ways an 
impairment impacts daily living may help avoid summary judgment 
even under the current narrow construction of the ADA.354 
In final assessment, courts are not wholly incorrect to conclude 
that some disabilities appear plain on their face and do not require 
additional evidence to prove substantial limitation, whereas other 
claims require more proof.  Cases are being sent to juries, however, 
only when the courts think it obvious that the plaintiff can prove 
disability.  In other cases, courts have been insisting on evidence that 
is either unnecessary, unattainable, or both.  Close cases should first 
be recognized as such and second, be sent to the jury without falling 
back on disingenuous reasons for dismissing them. 
In and of itself, “average” is a problematic concept.  Undoubtedly, 
both individuals with disabilities and the medical and vocational 
professionals who work with them have a certain amount of resistance 
to the idea that there is an “average” person, because it suggests that 
there is a “normal” person.  The ADA treats individuals as individuals 
based on their abilities, and not on some exclusionary norm.355  
Courts have, of course, translated this into a narrow definition of the 
protected category, performing a gate-keeping role.  The best judge 
of whether the experiences of an individual are outside the norm, 
however, is the jury.  Jury common sense is preferable to judge-made 
common sense when the issue is one of common experience. 
CONCLUSION 
The common sense and life experience of the fact finder is 
typically the best judge of whether a limitation is substantial, at least 
in cases in which the plaintiff presents individualized evidence of a 
                                                          
 354. Employers have been encouraged to avoid “generic FCEs” when evaluating 
existing employees’ physical and functional abilities, because the ADA requires that 
such evaluations be job-related.  See Pransky & Dempsey, supra note 270, at 225.  On 
the flip side, plaintiffs’ attorneys and their experts should be sensitive to the need to 
demonstrate the impact on their client’s daily lives, not simply their generic 
functioning. 
 355. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2000) (characterizing individuals with 
disabilities as “a discrete and insular minority who have been faced with restrictions 
and limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and 
relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our society, based on 
characteristics that are beyond [their] control . . . and resulting from stereotypic 
assumptions not truly indicative of [their] individual ability”). 
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physical or mental impairment.  The demand made by some courts 
for specific comparative evidence places an inappropriate evidentiary 
burden on plaintiffs, even acknowledging a restrictive interpretation 
of “substantially limits.”  Plaintiffs, along with their medical and 
vocational experts, nonetheless need to do a better job of 
anticipating judicial hostility to ADA claims when they develop the 
record of their limitations, and not assume that common sense will, 
indeed, prevail. 
 
